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We investigate the impact of the interaction of disclosure and ownership structure on 
bank risk.  Using a sample of 209 commercial banks from Asia during the 2004-2010 
period, we find that disclosure is negatively associated with income volatility and that 
such an impact is stronger in the presence of block holders and institutional ownership 
and weaker with insider or government ownership. Our results also provide evidence 
that better disclosure ensures greater stability as measured by individual bank default 
risk. Furthermore, a deeper investigation shows that disclosure on income statement, 
loans, other earning assets, deposits, and memo lines plays a stronger role in limiting 
risk than disclosure on non-deposit liabilities.   
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1. Introduction 
The 2007-2008 global financial crisis has highlighted the need to enhance 
sound corporate governance principles.  As such, a lot of emphasis has been put on 
improving transparency for firms in general and specifically for financial institutions. 
The new bank regulatory framework (Basel III)1 imposes more stringent disclosure 
requirements to improve the ability of bank stakeholders to assess the riskiness of the 
institutions in which they are involved. However, whether better disclosure is actually 
beneficial remains an open question because too much information might also 
exacerbate the concerns of creditors and hence contribute to more instability (Hyytinen 
& Takalo, 2002; Nier, 2005; Tadesse, 2006). In this paper we investigate whether 
disclosure identically impacts the riskiness of banks with different ownership profiles 
and consider the differential impact of disclosure on various balance sheet and income 
statement items.  
Some studies argue that inadequate control mechanisms and asymmetric 
information lead to higher risk-taking in banks (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Cebenoyan et 
al, 1999). Such works claim that disclosure is expected to mitigate asymmetric 
information and hence stakeholders would be in more control with regard to bank risk-
taking. Similarly, Baumann and Nier (2004) observe that banks with a higher level of 
disclosure, as measured by a disclosure composite index, exhibit a lower stock price 
volatility. They argue that increasing the amount of disclosure would mitigate the 
heterogeneity of information on the bank's current conditions across different 
shareholders. In another study, Cordella and Yeyati (1998), as confirmed by Boot and 
Schmeits (2000), find that banks with greater disclosure are likely to have a lower 
default risk at equilibrium. However, requiring disclosure of more information may 
impose costs on banks and possibly overemphasize small problems that could by 
contagion affect the banking system as a whole (Kaufman and Scott, 2003; Tadesse, 
2006). In this regard, more disclosure could make the banking system more fragile. 
The level of bank disclosure is presumably related to bank characteristics 
including ownership type, governance and therefore the potential conflicts of interest 
among parties. The conflicts of interests between managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders have been widely documented since the seminal work of Jensen and 
                                                 
1 The Basel III Accord sets the revised disclosure requirements of qualitative and quantitative aspects of 
risk management, capital adequacy and underlying risk metrics. It also requires the disclosure of 
securitization exposures and off-balance sheet vehicles (BCBS, 2010, 2011).    
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Meckling (1976).  Further studies suggest that when owners' control on management is 
weak due to lack of market discipline, managers are inclined to pursue their own 
interests instead of those of shareholders (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997). In the banking sector, such issues are further complicated because 
more parties are involved in the so-called multi-relationship-based transactions (Wilson 
et al, 2010). Apart from shareholders, debt holders and managers, deposit insurers and 
regulators are also involved in the process with their own interests which in many cases 
possibly conflict with each other. Various factors such as bank balance sheet opacity 
(Diamond, 1984; Morgan, 2002),  low level of depositor education, limited protection 
of minority shareholders particularly in emerging markets (King and Levine 1993 a, b; 
Levine 1997, Wilson et al, 2010) also play an important role.  
The banking sector is subject to numerous regulations aiming to protect the 
rights of depositors, shareholders and to make banks operate more efficiently. 
Accordingly, bank risk-taking behavior is supposed to be within tolerable levels while 
those aforementioned factors persistently interact with each other. Since many parties 
participate in bank activities, it is expected that other ownership characteristics namely 
institutional ownership, government ownership, blockholder ownership and its 
concentration would also affect bank risk (Angkinand & Wihlborg, 2010, Barry et al., 
2011). With regard to bank ownership, Saunders et al. (1990) have shown that 
stockholder-controlled banks in the US take more risk than manager-controlled banks 
because stockholders can diversify their investment whereas managers’ wealth is 
largely composed of non-diversifiable human capital. However, some authors  show 
that the relationship between managerial ownership and bank risk-taking is not 
monotonic (e.g., Brewer and Saidenberg 1996; Demsetz et al., 1997). Bank risk 
initially decreases with higher managerial ownership and then starts increasing. Brewer 
and Saidenberg (1996) argue that such a U-shaped (i.e. convex) relationship is due to 
the interplay of two opposing factors, managerial risk-aversion/ entrenchment and 
moral hazard problems, at different levels of managerial ownership. A study by Gorton 
and Rosen (1995), however, finds an inverted U-shaped relationship (i.e. concave). 
Further, studies in the US have also found that banks exhibit a greater incentive for 
risk-taking than other institutions in the financial sector (see Cordell et al., 1993; Esty, 
1997; Karels & McClatchey, 1999). Previous studies (e.g. Ciancanelli and Gonzalez, 
2000; Levine, 2004) argue that the agency problem in the banking sector is more 
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complex than in other sectors. For example, the conflicts of interests may not only 
occur between owners, managers and lenders but also involve the regulator. 
Complexity is exacerbated because of the regulator’s commitment to act as the lender 
of the last resort.   
In this paper we examine the relationship between disclosure and the risk-taking 
behavior of Asian banks. Specifically, we investigate whether the amount of disclosure 
identically impacts bank risk-taking and bank default risk under different ownership 
profiles. While previous studies have found ownership structure to affect bank risk-
taking, we look into whether disclosure will impact bank risk-taking differently in the 
presence of different ownership structure. We hence test whether the ownership 
structure moderates the disclosure – risk taking relationship. A higher level of 
disclosure might affect risk differently under different ownership structures because the 
incentives of shareholders to use the information to effectively monitor the managers 
will be more or less strong depending on their stakes and the degree of ownership 
dispersion. We extend the literature in several directions. First, we construct a 
composite disclosure score using the disclosure index of Baumann and Nier (2004) & 
Nier (2005), and decompose it into six sub indices to capture deeper insights on the 
relationship between disclosure and risk. We are hence able to test the impact of a 
global composite index but also to go deeper to examine which disclosure components 
(sub-indices) more effectively affect bank risk. Second, we consider various bank 
ownership profiles by looking at stakes owned by managers, governments, institutional 
investors, and block holders or large owners. Managerial ownership, as discussed 
above, is expected to align the interests of managers and shareholders. Institutional 
ownership should lead also to better decisions regarding the bank’s investment and 
financing decisions. While the literature on emerging markets mainly considers state 
ownership and foreign ownership (e.g. Angkinand and Wihlborg (2010)), we rather 
focus on other types of ownership structures namely insider ownership, institutional 
ownership and block holding. Third, previous studies have typically paid more 
attention on non financial firms (see Claessens and Fan, 2002) and few works have 
focused on how disclosure might alter the relationship between insider ownership and 
bank risk-taking. Lastly, most of previous studies have essentially looked into financial 
institutions in developed markets rather than in emerging markets (see Saunders et al, 
1990; Lee, Mayers, and Smith, 1997; Garcia-Marco & Robles-Fernandez, 2008). We 
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consider banks operating in emerging economies in Asia which have rapidly grown to 
play a major role in the global financial system. Furthermore, ownership structure in 
Asia is far more complex with less widely held institutions and far more pyramidal 
ownership structures than in Western countries (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 
2000; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013).  
We consider a sample of 209 publicly-listed banks from 11 countries in Asia 
for the 2004-2010 period and find that a higher disclosure index is significantly and 
negatively associated with default risk and income volatility. We also find that the 
impact on income volatility is stronger in the presence of block holders and 
institutional ownership and weaker with insider or government ownership. 
Furthermore, a deeper investigation shows that disclosure on loans, other earning 
assets, deposits, and memo lines plays a stronger role in limiting risk than disclosure on 
income statements and non-deposit liabilities. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section offers some 
conceptual background and presents the hypotheses that we test. Section 3 describes 
the econometric model and the data. Section 4 presents the results. Finally, section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Related literature and hypotheses 
Publicly listed firms have to file dozens of reports to capital market authorities. 
In the case of financial institutions, the demand for disclosure is arguably higher due to 
their business characteristics (i.e. opaqueness) and potential problems for overall 
financial stability. Pillar 3 of the revised Basel Accord states that the disclosure 
requirement on banks is aimed to allow bank owners and regulators to monitor bank 
activities and to achieve prudential banking practices. While a large body of the 
literature highlights a positive impact of disclosure on stability, some authors consider  
it to be questionable.  
The demand for disclosure has initially been addressed by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) regarding the moral hazard problem due to separation between ownership and 
control. Because outside shareholders are not involved in day-to-day firm’s activities, 
they require the manager to disclose all relevant information in order to evaluate the 
firm's performance. In this perspective, an adequate level of disclosure should allow 
shareholders and potential investors to mitigate the agency problem. For banks more 
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specifically, because a large portion of their liabilities are short term, the release of 
more information is expected to enable better monitoring and prevent  higher risk-
taking that could lead to withdrawals from their short term debt holders (depositors) 
and/or a higher cost of funding (see Cordella and Yeyati, 1998, Botosan & Plumlee, 
2002; Francis, Khurana,  Levine, 2004; Pereira, 2005; Bertay, Demicgüç-Kunt & 
Huizinga, 2013). By reducing risk-taking incentives, disclosure of information is also 
expected to lower the probability of bank failures. Some authors  argue that previous 
banking crises could be partly attributed to the lack of bank transparency (see Fischer, 
1999; Nier, 2005; Tadesse, 2006). Baumann and Nier (2004) show that banks with a 
higher amount of disclosure regarding their risk level tend to take lower risk. Nier 
(2005) also finds that more transparent banks are less at risk of experiencing financial 
problems and that their stock prices are less volatile2. Nier and Baumann (2006) show 
that greater disclosure and transparency lead to stronger market discipline and hence to 
lower risk-taking. They also show that the effect of disclosure diminishes when there is 
evidence of a high degree of government support in the case of bank failure.  
Nevertheless, a higher amount of disclosure and hence transparency might also 
be counterproductive. First, as a bank discloses more information, it has to bear an 
increasing cost of production and dissemination of such information. Furthermore, by 
releasing more information, competitors could extract and exploit key information to 
take advantages (Hyytinen and Takalo, 2003). Regarding this, Tadesse (2006) argues 
that bank transparency may be linked to banking system stability in various ways. In 
the “disclosure-fragility’ view, it is believed that a negligible problem affecting a given 
bank may destroy the trust of all depositors as this problem is revealed to the public. 
This approach departs from the assumption that a bank’s nature of business is highly 
dependent on public trust. With this regard, a higher level of disclosure could endanger 
banking stability when problems in specific banks trigger a projection of general 
problems in the banking system as a whole generating bank runs and panics (Gilbert 
and Vaugan, 1998; Kaufman and Scott, 2003; Gorton & Huang, 2006). Further 
disclosure could hence wipe out investors' confidence and lead to the failure of both 
                                                 
2 Nier (2005) uses large changes in banks’ stock prices as a market indicator of banking problems. He 
argues that a bank is experiencing a severe problem when its stock price drops dramatically (i.e., stock 
returns of−50% or worse) and hence the change not only indicates the extent to which risk has 
materialized, but also incorporates the effect of any resulting responses in credit spreads of the bank. 
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strong and weak banks rather than providing a better monitoring vehicle (Tadesse, 
2006). 
Many works have documented the relationship between bank ownership 
structure and risk. In particular, Saunders et al. (1990) find a positive relationship 
between insider ownership and risk-taking for a sample of US banks during the 1978-
1985 period. Using Saving and Loan associations (S&Ls) data, Cebenoyan et al., 
(1995) show that a high level of managerial ownership is related to higher S&Ls risk-
taking. Chen, Steiner and White (1998), however, find that managerial ownership is 
inversely related to depository institutions' risk. Their analysis further reveals that the 
relationship is non linear. Corporate control theory highlights that in the absence of 
adequate control by shareholders as well as the existence of information asymmetries 
managers could badly manage the bank and pursue riskier yet unprofitable investments 
for the growth purpose upon which their performance might be attributed. This 
problem is exacerbated when bank owners cannot effectively monitor bank managers  
and their performance. From the perspective of agency theory, this moral hazard 
behavior could be tempered by allowing managers to hold shares in order to align their 
interests with those of outside shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Saunders et 
al., 1990; Allen and Cebenoyan, 1991). Empirically, Gorton and Rosen (1995) find that 
higher levels of managerial ownership in bank holding companies (BHCs) lead to 
lower credit risk.  
However, since principal-agent relationships in banks involve many parties 
including creditors as well as other stakeholders and because bank assets are 
considered as opaque, higher managerial ownership might not necessarily lead to lower 
risk. The presence of the central bank as a lender of the last resort, for instance, could 
lead to higher risk-taking incentives. Hence, the effect of ownership on risk might not 
be always linear and positive. For example, evidence found by Anderson and Fraser 
(2000) shows that there is a positive link between insider ownership and bank risk-
taking. Other studies (Mork et al, 1988; Demsetz et al, 1997; Gorton and Rosen, 1995; 
Knopf and Dolde, 2006) find that such a relationship is not linear. They argue that a U-
shaped insider ownership – risk taking relationship emerges because at very low level 
of ownership, almost all of the manager’s wealth comes from predetermined 
compensations particularly salary leading to the persistence of agency problems. As 
their ownership increases, their interest will be aligned with those of outside 
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shareholders but only above a certain threshold. Further above managers may become 
entrenched and are inclined to achieve their private agenda again. However, at that 
point, when a single party holds a large level of shares, another agency problem 
namely between large shareholders and small investors emerges. Large shareholders 
can divert funds for their own personal benefits in the form of special (hidden) 
dividends and preferential deals (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1998, 
Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). They can impose some direct costs on other 
stakeholders, most notably the minority shareholders and employees. 
Theory suggests that if ownership is widely dispersed among a large number of 
small shareholders the incentive to monitor the manager will be lower. This free rider 
problem inevitably induces more opportunistic behavior by managers. Studies by 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Prowse (1995), Faccio and Lang (2002), and Caprio et al. 
(2007) show that the banking sector particularly in developed markets is generally 
featured by a lower ownership concentration. In developing markets, such a situation, 
when coexisting with a lack of market discipline, might lead to a worse bank 
governance. 
The existence of external shareholders such as institutional investors and block 
holders who have significant voting rights can also affect the level of risk-taking at a 
bank. Such agents are assumed to pay more attention and make more efforts to monitor 
bank risk-taking because of their large investment scale in shares and their expertise to 
do so compared to small investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). These types of 
shareholders will promote shareholder-driven decisions including the careful control of 
the bank’s riskiness. But they can also promote higher risk-taking if their wealth is 
sufficiently diversified.  Wright et al. (1996) observe that whilst institutional ownership 
positively affect firms' risk-taking, block holding has no significant influence on bank 
risk. Interestingly, Knopf and Teall (1996) find a strong negative relationship between 
risk and outside ownership in the U.S. following the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).  
As another type of shareholding, government ownership is theoretically 
expected to encourage banks to maintain their financial soundness and to promote good 
governance. However, in many cases state-owned banks come under pressure to serve 
politically-related parties or are encouraged to take on more risk because they expect 
support (bail-out) in case on financial distress.  Consistently, previous studies have 
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found banks with government ownership to be more inclined towards higher risk-
taking strategies (Martinez-Peria, 2000; Barth et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2005; Iannotta 
et al., 2007).  
Several studies have examined the relationship between disclosure and other 
variables. Using companies listed on the S&P 500 index, Baek et al., (2009) observe 
that managerial ownership is negatively related to the level of disclosure. Such 
relationship is significant for firms with a low level of managerial ownership (i.e. ≤5%) 
but not at higher level of managerial ownership (i.e. ≥5%) where managers tend to 
make a very limited and selective disclosure. Nevertheless, a study by Eng and Mak 
(2003) finds that lower managerial ownership and significant government ownership 
are linked with increased disclosure.  
From an agency theory perspective, the principal should monitor the agent in 
order to prevent potential expropriation by the latter. Hence, institutional investors that 
have a large amount of shares in a bank should exert strong monitoring efforts.  With 
their strong position and expertise, institutional investors can impose a disclosure 
requirement as a low-cost mechanism to monitor the bank manager’s performance. 
Healy et al (1999) observe a positive relationship between disclosure quality, measured 
by AIMR rating3, and institutional ownership. Similarly, Bushee and Noe (2000) find 
that institutions with a large amount of ownership have several reasons to require 
higher quality of disclosure as a way to offset monitoring costs. At a first stage, as 
disclosure increases, the impact on the bank's stock price volatility is negative due to 
lower information asymmetry. They conclude that the smoother behavior of stock 
prices decreases the cost of capital. At a second stage, a better disclosure could provide 
profitable trading opportunities that attract institutional investors (Baumann and Nier, 
2004). Eventually, investors with low access to private information may have to rely 
more on public information (see Healy and Palepu, 2001; Hassan & Marston, 2010). 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, they might also prefer the bank with higher level of 
disclosure.      
 
                                                 
3 AIMR rating is a disclosure survey conducted by the Association for Investment Management and 
Research (AIMR). This measure of disclosure reflects the evaluations (rating) of leading financial 
analysts for companies’ aggregate disclosure (mandatory and voluntary disclosure) within three 
categories: annual published and other required information, quarterly and other published but not 
required information, and other aspects of disclosure such as investor and analyst relations. The final 
disclosure score is calculated as a weighted average of those three categories.  
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The discussions above suggest that the effect of disclosure on bank risk is debatable 
and seemingly conflicting. Agency theory argues that an adequate level of disclosure is 
of importance for outside investors as well as inside shareholders to monitor the bank 
manager's risk-taking behavior. As the nature of banking business is more opaque 
compared to other industries, banks should be subject to stringent disclosure 
requirement. In line with this, the disclosure-stability theory predicts that a greater 
level of disclosure and subsequent transparency will allow for stronger market 
discipline through better asset allocation and lower asymmetric information among 
market participants. In the presence of better disclosure, investors can judge the bank's 
performance more accurately and less risky banks will enjoy a lower cost of funding 
while riskier banks will suffer from higher cost and higher probability of default. 
Hence, better disclosure will lead banks to pursue lower risk strategies on average. On 
the other hand, a higher level of disclosure could be a catalyst for minor and specific 
bank problems to turn into widely spread rumors depleting investors’ confidence and 
triggering a bank run. As such the relationship between disclosure and bank risk-taking 
and default risk can be either positive or negative. Also, it has been argued that 
disclosure is strongly related to corporate governance characteristics and in particular 
to ownership characteristics while the latter also affect risk-taking behavior. Hence, we 
predict that the effect of disclosure on risk will closely depend on the ownership 
structure of banks.  
 
3. Data and Empirical Specifications 
We retrieve data from Bankscope for publicly-listed commercial banks in 11 
Asian countries4 over the 2004-2010 period.  For the countries we consider, Bankscope 
has reported financial/accounting information for 216 commercial banks which 
provides us with 1728 bank-year observations. When some observations are missing, 
we look into annual reports which we download from the banks' websites or other 
sources.  In some countries such as Vietnam, banks do not provide up-to-date reports 
on their websites in which case our sample is relatively limited. We delete banks with 
less than four consecutive years of observations5.  We exclude outliers by eliminating 
                                                 
4 China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and 
Vietnam. 
5 This condition allows us to accurately compute the standard deviations of some variables to estimate 
risk measures. 
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the extreme observations (1% lowest and 1% highest values) and check the statistical 
properties of the considered variables by conducting mean tests and distribution tests 
for all the variables. Most of our country level variables (i.e. interest rate, inflation, 
growth) come from WDI (World Development Index) by the World Bank. The deposit 
insurance coverage data are retrieved from Demirgüç-Kunt et al., (2005) but we also 
rely on the information provided by the central bank or the deposit insurance institution 
in each country to match the data with our sample period. We eventually end up with 
209 banks and approximately 1451 bank-year observations to perform our empirical 
investigation. 
 
3.1. Risk proxies 
We use three measures as a proxy for risk which is our dependent variable.  
First, as many previous studies, we use the Z-score as a proxy for default risk (Boyd 
and Graham, 1988; Goyeau and Tarazi, 1992; Lepetit et al., 2008; Barry et al., 2011). 
This score is defined as (ROA + EA) / SDROA, where ROA is the bank's return on 
assets, EA is the ratio of equity to total assets, and SDROA is the rolling standard 
deviation of ROA based on observations in year t, t-1 and t-2 (Agoraki et al. 2011). We 
also split the Z-score into its two components Z-score 1 defined as ROA divided by 
SDROA and Z-score 2 which is EA divided by SDROA. Z-score 1 is expected to 
measure asset risk and Z-score 2 leverage risk. Second, we consider as a proxy of risk-
taking, the ratio of non-performing loans-to-bank capital (NPL-to-CAP) as in 
Angkinand and Wihlborg, (2010). Accordingly, we use SDROA as a measure of 
income volatility. As an alternative proxy, we also use the standard deviation of the 
return on average equity (SDROE)6.  
3.3. Disclosure, ownership and other variables  
The main independent variable in this study is the disclosure index (DI). 
Previous studies on disclosure generally conclude that disclosure can be analyzed and 
measured by two main approaches (Hassan and Marston, 2010); indirect approach (e.g. 
perception of financial analysts/investors on banks’ disclosure practices) and direct 
approach (e.g. content analysis, disclosure of good/bad news, and disclosure index).  
Our disclosure index in this study is based on an extensive list of items that could be 
disclosed in bank reports (annual report, financial statements, regulatory report, 
                                                 
6 We define average equity at time t as (outstanding equity at time t + outstanding equity at time t-1)/2. 
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prospectus et cetera). Each item can either refer to a mandatory or a voluntary item. 
More specifically, we consider a Disclosure Index (DI) in the steps of Baumann and 
Nier (2004), and Nier (2005) which is based on the information provided by 17 items  
referring - in the Bankscope database - to bank assets, liabilities, memo lines, capital, 
and also off-balance sheet items (see Appendix C for the list of the 17 accounting 
items). This index represents whether a bank discloses one or more sources of risk 
(e.g., interest rate risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk). Each item is assigned a 
value of 1 if an expected financial item is reported and 0 otherwise with the exception 
of the index for securities by type and the capital index for which we assign the values 
of 2 and 3 respectively to obtain a total maximum value of 21. The composite index is 
then estimated by dividing the obtained value by 21 and hence the composite index 
ranges from 0 when none of the items are reported to 1 (100%) when all the items are 
reported. Regarding ownership, we consider various characteristics as discussed above. 
First, following Morck et al., (1988), Gorton and Rosen (1995), and Demsetz et al., 
(1997) we use insider ownership (Insider) which is defined as the percentage of stocks 
held by officers or directors within a bank. Second, we account for institutional 
ownership (Inst) that represents the percentage of shares held by institutional investors. 
Third, we measure block shareholders (Block) as the sum of the shares owned by 
individuals who own 5 percent or more of equity divided by total outstanding shares of 
the bank. Fourth, we measure ownership concentration (HHI) using a Herfindahl- 
Hirschman Index with 100 representing the most concentrated ownership and 0 as the 
most dispersed (see Appendix B for the formula). Fifth, we measure government or 
state ownership (Gown) by the percentage of shares held by the government.  
In our regression framework we consider a set of firm and country-level control 
variables. On the bank level, the franchise value is likely to affect bank risk-taking. 
Demsetz et al., (1997) and Laeven and Levine (2009) argue that banks with higher 
franchise value are likely to take less risk since higher franchise values imply higher 
bankruptcy costs. To capture this effect, we use the ratio of market-to-book value of 
equity (PBV) which is measured by the ratio of market value of equity to its book 
value.  We expect a negative coefficient for this variable. Next, we use the tier 1 capital 
ratio (Tier1) as a measure of bank capitalization or leverage.  Banks with higher level 
of capital are able to more easily sustain loss events and hence avoid failure. Bank 
capital might also determine the level of risk that banks might be willing to take. As 
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such, this ratio is expected to capture the bank's degree of risk aversion. We also 
consider the effect of size on bank risk. As size increases, banks may benefit from 
better portfolio diversification benefits leading to a negative relationship with risk. 
Also, as bank size increases, the disclosure requirement will be higher improving 
stakeholders’ ability to monitor and prevent banks from excessive risk-taking. On the 
other hand, by increasing its size, a bank could benefit from To-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) 
safety net subsidies (De Nicolo, 2000). In this regard, there could be a positive 
relationship between bank size and risk. In this study, size is measured by the natural 
logarithm of book value of total assets (Size). 
At the country level, we control for the GDP growth, real interest rates, 
inflation rates, and deposit insurance coverage. GDP Growth (Growth) is measured as 
the real GDP growth rate (Lee, 2009; Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2010). Interest rates 
could affect banks’ cost of funds as well as borrowers' behavior. An increase in the 
interest rate is often associated with higher problem loans and default rates that 
eventually affect the riskiness of banks themselves. We use the real interest rate 
(Interest) (Lee, 2009; Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2010; Forssbæck, 2011). Next, the 
inflation rate (Inflation) will determine how banks behave and will hence impact both 
their assets and liabilities (Lee, 2009; Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2010; Forssbæck, 
2011). We also consider deposit insurance as a control variable. Better covered 
depositors will likely have a weaker incentive to monitor the bank to prevent it from 
pursuing riskier activities (Demsetz et al, 1997). Furthermore, explicit deposit 
insurance is often considered as creating higher moral hazard incentives leading to 
higher financial fragility and increasing the likelihood of bank crises (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 2002). Deposit insurance (Covdep) is measured by ln (1+coverage of 
deposit insurance) where coverage of deposit insurance is the ratio of the explicit 
coverage limit per deposit account to the average deposit per capita (Demirguç-Kunt et 
al., 2005; Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2010).  
These variables are used to estimate a panel model to capture the impact on risk 
of disclosure for different types of ownerships, as follows: 
Risk ,  = β  + β DI ,  + ∑ β  Own  , 
 
     + ∑ β  DIxOwn  , 
  
     +   β  Controls ,  +
 
     
 Year control + ε ,  (1) 
where, Risk is either the Z-score, Z-score 1, Z-score 2, NPL-to-Cap, SDROA, or 
SDROE. DI is the disclosure index. Own is either insider ownership (Insider), 
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institutional ownership (Inst), government ownership (Gown), blockholder ownership 
(Block), or HHI. DIxOwn stands for the interaction terms, defined as the disclosure 
index times each ownership variable to capture the relationship between disclosure and 
risk for different ownership characteristics and levels. Controls is a vector of control 
variables consisting of the price-to-book ratio (PBV), total assets (Size), the tier-1 
capital ratio (Capital), GDP growth (Growth), the real interest rate (Interest), the 
inflation rate (Inflation), deposit insurance coverage (Covdep), and also year control. 
Appendix B gives detailed descriptions of these variables.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the whole sample of 209 banks 
and Table 2 reports the information country by country. Overall, the banks in our 
sample exhibit sufficient heterogeneity to conduct an empirical investigation. Banks 
have on average a Z-score of 81.6 with banks in Malaysia reaching on average the 
highest value followed by Singapore, Philippines, Japan, Thailand, India, China, 
Taiwan, Indonesia, South Korea, and Vietnam. In terms of Z-score 1, Malaysian banks 
also present the highest score (23.39), but now followed by India (10.17), and Thailand 
(9.37). The average value for all countries is 6.4. Similar to Z-score, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Japan are countries with the highest Z-score 1. The average value for 
all countries is approximately 74.9.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Interestingly, in terms of NPL-to-Cap, banks in South Korea exhibit the lowest 
value followed by Singapore, Taiwan, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, China, and 
Philippines. Having experiencing the hardest hit during the 1997 financial crisis, 
Thailand still seems to suffer from higher levels of the NPL-to-Cap ratio (1.16) 
compared to others (the full sample mean is equal to  0.69). Turning to other risk 
measures, the standard deviations of ROA (SDROA) are found to be relatively high, on 
average, in some countries particularly in Indonesia, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
Accordingly, SDROE shows similar patterns banks in Taiwan, Thailand, and Indonesia 
exhibiting the highest values. 
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Table 2 shows that the average disclosure index is 0.65 (65.09%) with higher 
values for Thailand, Singapore, China, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Japan 
(see also Table 3 Panel A). Note that this index only reflects the amount of items 
disclosed and does not necessarily represent the quality or reliability of disclosure. 
Hence, a higher index should be interpreted as banks providing more information upon 
which outside investors can make a better assessment regarding risk and/or 
performance.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
The average of the disclosure index increases from around 0.59 (58.53%) in 
2004 to 0.65 (64.83%) in 2010 suggesting that Asian banks now disclose more 
financial items than in previous years (Table 3 Panel B). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
As expected, insider ownership (Iown) reported in Table 1 is generally not as 
pervasive as those in other industries. This could be attributed to the fact that the 
banking industry is subject to tighter regulation that makes it uneasy for individuals to 
hold a larger amount of shares. Hence, we can see that insider ownership only reaches 
the average of 0.65%. We also note that insider ownership in most banks is very low 
although for a few banks, it can reach 49.67% in South Korea and India. We observe a 
very small percentage in Japan, Malaysia, Taiwan, China, Thailand, and Indonesia. On 
the other hand, the average insider ownership for banks in Vietnam, Philippines, India, 
Singapore and South Korea is relatively higher than the full sample mean (0.65%).   
We consider institutional ownership (Inst) as the percentage of shares held by 
any type of institutional investors. The average of Institutional ownership is 51.05%, 
suggesting that banks in Asia are mainly controlled by institutional investors with 
lower levels in Japan (24.95%). Government ownership is higher in India, Indonesia, 
China, Malaysia and South Korea. Indonesia, India, China, Philippines and South 
Korea exhibit considerable levels of block shareholders with more than 50% on 
average (higher than the sample mean of 40%).  
Ownership in Indonesian banks is the most concentrated one with a HHI index 
of around 40% followed by India, China, South Korea and Thailand. This is consistent 
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with Claessens et al., (2000) who find that the ownership in Asian countries is 
concentrated among few investors and that concentration is lower in countries with 
higher level of economic development. Consistently, they find that Indonesia and 
Thailand are among the countries with the largest concentration of ownership. Overall, 
the average concentration proxy is equal to 19.28% for the full sample. Other control 
variables, both at the bank and country level, are also presented in Table 1.   
Table 4 presents the correlations between the variables used in our study. As 
expected, the disclosure index (DI) is positively correlated with Z-score, Z-score 1, and 
Z-score2 and negatively with SDROA, and SDROE. In other words, a higher level of 
disclosure is apparently associated with a lower level of risk although the correlation 
coefficients are relatively low.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE] 
 
The correlations between ownership variables (Insider, Inst, Gown, Block, 
HHI) and the Z-score are all negative and those between the ownership variables and 
the other risk proxies generally positive.  These simple correlation measures suggest 
that risk is both associated with disclosure and ownership structure as reported in 
previous literature. The correlation matrix shows that many of our ownership variables 
are strongly correlated. Thus to deal with collinearity issues we introduce the 
ownership variables one by one in the regressions.  
We now turn to our regression analysis which enables to capture the effect of 
disclosure under different ownership profiles. Our aim is to investigate whether 
disclosing more information will allow banks to be better monitored and specifically 
whether the incentives of any large or majority shareholders to push the banks toward 
more risky investments will be restricted.  
   
4.2. Baseline regressions 
Previous studies highlight that empirical governance research often suffers from 
serious endogeneity concerns (see Wintoki et al, 2012; Andres & Vallelado, 2008). In 
our case, our main variable of interest, disclosure, is presumably endogenous. The 
demand for more disclosure, for instance, may be driven by factors such as the degree 
of asymmetric information between bank managers (insider) and outside investors or 
between minority versus majority shareholders (i.e. ownership characteristics) or the 
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disclosure requirement in each country (e.g. voluntary versus mandatory). In such a 
case, panel regression within estimators, for instance, would be inconsistent.  
To deal with this potential problem, we use the instrument variable (IV) model 
for our panel data as proposed by Schaffer (2010)7. We face the issue of which variable 
can be used as the instrument i.e. highly correlated with the variables of interest but 
uncorrelated with the error term. We consider regulatory quality and the natural 
logarithm of the bank’s age as the instruments by checking their validity with the 
Hansen test. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) argue that the level of voluntary disclosure is 
related to the regulatory environment. Ciancanelli and Reyes (2001) argue that 
regulation might be considered as an external governance force that acts at the banking 
industry level as a whole and at the level of individual banks. One can also argue that 
disclosure is also related to investors' legal protection; the better the legal protection, 
the better the quality and the quantity of information flow to investors. For this 
purpose, we use the regulatory quality index and government effectiveness index, a 
part of The Worldwide Governance Indicator developed by Kaufmann et al., (2010). 
This indicator captures the perceptions of the ability of the country to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. The age (in natural logarithm) of the bank, by construction, is 
exogenous. Table 5 reports the output of the baseline regressions. In each panel, we run 
a regression with the disclosure index (DI) and ownership variables 
First of all, in each of the first stage regressions, the F-test of the null 
hypothesis that the exogenous variables do not explain the endogenous regressors (DI) 
is rejected at the one percent significance level. In other words, disclosure is actually 
endogenous and affected by other variables as confirmed by the endogeneity tests (see 
the last rows Table 5). We also find that the F-statistics on the excluded instruments in 
the first stage regressions are above 108, suggesting that our instruments are 
sufficiently strong. In Table 5, we report the Hansen J-statistic of the null hypothesis 
that all instruments are uncorrelated with the error term indicating that our instruments 
in all models are valid. Our results reveal that disclosure is not exogenous and hence 
the IV model is more efficient except for the NPL-to-Cap regression. 
                                                 
7 The instrument variable models are obtained using the Schaffer ‘xtivreg2’ module  (Schaffer, 2010) in 
stata  
8 As a rule of thumb, F-statistics above 10 suggest that the instruments are sufficiently strong (Stock, 
Wright and Yogo, 2002). To conserve the space, the results are available upon request. 
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[INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE] 
 
With regard to the disclosure index (DI), the coefficients of DI are generally 
consistent with the disclosure-stability view. As expected, the disclosure variable is 
positively related to default risk and negatively related to income volatility in 
accordance with previous work (Cordella and Yeyati (1998), Fischer (1999), and Nier 
and Baumann (2006)). Better disclosure is also associated with lower bank default risk. 
Banks with better disclosure also engage in less risky investments as captured by the 
volatility of their returns.  
The coefficient of insider ownership (Iown) is only significant for Z-score 1 
models. Also, the coefficient of institutional ownership (Inst) is never significant.  
However, our results report that government ownership is associated with 
higher default risk and higher income volatility. Claessens et al., (2000) argue that in 
Asia, families or conglomerates commonly hold the majority of corporate shares while 
the states hold less. However, in our sample state ownership is also prevalent and our 
results show that government ownership (Gown) encourages banks to take more risk. 
In such banks, managers might have greater incentives to follow their own interests, 
favor government enterprises or to be more inclined towards relationship lending. Our 
result is in line with previous studies (Barth et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2005; Iannota et 
al., 2007; Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2010). 
Block ownership is significantly positively related to default risk (higher Z-
scores indicate lower default risk) and income volatility but concentration (HHI) has no 
impact on risk. The coefficients of PBV (the price-to-book ratio as a proxy of franchise 
value) and Size (bank size) are not significant.  
As expected, the Tier-1 capital ratio positively affects Z-score and Z-score 2.  
Further, we find that higher economic growth (Growth) and larger deposit insurance 
coverage (Covdep) are related to higher default risk, income volatility, and credit risk, 
supporting the earlier work of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, (2002). A higher 
interest rate is associated with lower default risk as shown by the Z-score 1 models 
(significant at the 5% for model (1) and (4) and at the 10% for model (2) and (3)). 
Lastly, we find limited evidence that inflation is linked to risk, considering that 
its coefficient is only significant at the 10% level for SDROE.   
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In the next section, we first interact disclosure with ownership types to assess 
its impact for different ownership characteristics. We then decompose the disclosure 
index into sub-indices and examine their effect on risk.  
 
4.3. Interaction of Disclosure and Ownership  
Up to this stage we have examined the effect of disclosure as well as ownership 
on bank risk-taking incentives without considering their interplay. We now run 
augmented regressions with interaction terms between DI and various ownership 
variables. Our aim is to investigate whether the effect of disclosure is similar or not for 
different ownership structures. The results are reported in Table 6. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE] 
 
As in our previous regressions the disclosure variable DI is significantly and 
negatively associated with default risk and income volatility. The results of the tests of 
the significance of the sum of the coefficients of the disclosure variable and each 
interaction term separately indicate that disclosure is effective in reducing risk (except 
for NPL-to-Cap) for all types of ownership arrangements (see the sums of coefficients 
and their significance tests in the last rows of Table 6). But the interaction terms, taken 
on their own, are also significantly different from zero implying that the effect of 
disclosure varies to some extent with differences in ownership characteristics.  
Based on the sum of the coefficients of disclosure and the interaction term 
(DI+DIxOwnership) in each model, our results indicate that the impact of disclosure in  
is stronger in the presence of block holding (model 4), followed by institutional 
ownership (model 2), ownership concentration (model 5). The effect is the weakest in 
the presence government ownership (model 3) and insider ownership (model 1).  
Our results are consistent with the conjecture that higher insider ownership will 
weaken the effect of disclosure because of the role played by managerial ownership in 
selecting which information should be disclosed or retained (Baek et al., 2009; Eng and 
Mak, 2003). Government ownership is also expected to lower the impact of disclosure 
on risk-taking if such banks are believed to be more easily bailed out in the event of 
financial distress.   
Institutional investors, which are more sophisticated than small investors and 
hold a substantial portion of shares, have higher incentives to monitor which is also the 
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case for the block holders. Their presence strengthens the impact of disclosure and 
provides higher discipline and more transparency for smaller investors.    
On the whole our results show that the effect of disclosure on risk varies in the 
presence of different ownership profiles. Specifically, although better disclosure is 
associated with lower risk-taking the impact is weaker in the presence of government 
ownership and insider ownership and it is the strongest in the presence of block holders 
or institutional investors.    
 
4.4. Decomposing the disclosure index 
As discussed above, the disclosure index (DI) is a composite score gathered 
from 17 individual items on bank financial reports (Baumann and Nier, 2004; Nier, 
2005). The regressions in the previous sections have enabled us to examine the effect 
of disclosure in its composite form. One could argue that a given component (sub 
index) might have a different impact compared to the other components. Note that the 
disclosure index we adopt in this study gives an equal weight to each component (sub 
index).  
To take our investigation deeper, we decompose the disclosure index into its 
main groups by simply regrouping the items into disclosure on assets (i.e. loan 
(DILoan) and other earning assets (DIEA)), liability (i.e. deposits (DIDep) and other 
funding (DIFund)), memo lines (DIMemo) including contingent liabilities and Off-
balance sheet items, and income statement (DIIS) as in the classification by the 
Bauman and Nier (2004) and Nier (2005) (see Appendix C). We expect such a 
decomposition to provide insights on which items/sub indices have a stronger impact 
on risk. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE] 
 
Table 7 presents the regressions on the six disclosure sub indices (model 1 – 
model 6) for each risk measure9. Disclosure on loans (DILoan), disclosure on other 
earning assets (DIEA), disclosure on deposits (DIDep), disclosure on bank’s memo line 
(DIMemo), and disclosure on income statement (DIIS) have significant impacts on risk 
as better disclosure on these items are linked to lower income volatility (i.e. SDROA 
and SDROE) and default risk (i.e. Z-score, Z-score 1, and Z-score 2). These findings 
                                                 
9 The results remain the same when we include the ownership variables. 
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are consistent with the main results obtained with the composite index (DI). 
Nevertheless, we do not find any significant coefficients for the sub indices standing 
for credit risk. Furthermore, disclosure on funding sources (DIFund) is rarely 
significant or only at the ten percent level. DIFund is the disclosure sub index 
comprising disclosure on money market funding, long-term funding including bonds 
and subordinated debt. An extensive literature argues that because some types of 
funding such as subordinated debt are not insured a higher portion of such liabilities in 
the balance sheet will provide incentives to take on less risk.  Otherwise banks will be 
charged higher rates or subject to higher withdrawal risk (Ellis and Flannery, 1992; 
Gropp and Vesala, 2004; Nier and Baumann, 2006). Hence, an increase in disclosure 
on DIFund is expected to temper risk-taking incentives. Its coefficient, however, is not 
significant for credit risk and income volatility.  
 
4.5. Robustness Checks 
In the previous sections, our models have accounted for various definitions of 
the dependent variable. This allows us to assess whether the effect of disclosure is 
robust. To check the consistency of the results, we also run standard panel regressions 
to control for time effects and unobservable heterogeneity10. The Hausman test 
concludes that fixed effect models are more consistent for all of our specifications11.  
On the whole, the effect of disclosure remains the same (see Table A.1 for the 
baseline regressions). Hence, banks with higher disclosure have lower default risk and 
engage in less risky investments as captured by the volatility of their returns, 
confirming our previous findings.   
Consistently with those of Table 5, the coefficients of insider ownership are 
only significant and positive for Z-score 1. Similarly to the evidence provided in the 
baseline regression, we find that the coefficient of institutional ownership is never 
significant. State-owned banks are again found to take higher risk and to exhibit higher 
levels of default risk. Nevertheless, we do not obtain significant coefficients for Block, 
except in model (3) for Z-score 1. Again, the coefficient of HHI remains insignificant 
in line with the baseline model. 
                                                 
10 The tests of redundant fixed effects-likelihood ratio suggest that this model (considering individual 
and time effects) is appropriate in this study. 
11 For brevity, the Hausman test outputs are not shown in the paper but are available from the authors 
upon request.   
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We also run the fixed effect models by considering the interaction terms 
between disclosure and ownership variables (see Table A2). As a whole, our main 
findings remain the same except for SDROE which is no longer significant. .  
Table A.3 reports the fixed effect regressions on the disclosure subindices 
(model 1 – model 6). Disclosure on loans (DILoan) and disclosure on other earning 
assets (DIEA) have significant impacts on risk; both are related to lower risk-taking 
and lower default risk in line with the disclosure-stability view. In contrast to the result 
in the IV models, we find that better disclosure on bank funding sources (DIFund) is 
generally linked with higher income volatility (SDROE) and default risk (Z-score and Z-
score 1) whereas disclosure on deposits (DIDep) plays no significant role.  
In addition, we further check the robustness of our results by considering 
alternative variables in the IV models12. We introduce ownership dummy variables for 
each type of ownership (i.e. d_Insiders, d_Inst, d_Gown, and d_Block). For instance, 
d_Insiders takes the value of one if the bank has insider ownership and zero otherwise. 
We hence replace the continuous variables with binary variables. Our main results 
remain the same.  
 
5. Conclusion and caveats 
The increasing complexity of bank businesses along with the global financial 
crisis of 2008 and various accounting scandals urge the need for better bank 
governance including disclosure requirements. More extensive and better disclosure is 
expected not only to reduce information asymmetries but also to mitigate agency 
problems particularly between bank managers and outside stakeholders, allowing 
outside investors as well as supervisory bodies to better monitor financial institutions. 
In some cases, higher disclosure is desirable because it can lead to lower cost of 
capital. The Basel accord, accordingly, encourages more disclosure to prevent banks 
from excessive risk-taking.  
This study examines the link between bank risk and the level of disclosure. We 
consider a sample of 209 commercial banks in Asia during the 2004-2010 period. Our 
findings show that higher disclosure scores are associated with lower default risk and 
lower bank income volatility. Also, the effect of disclosure on risk varies depending on 
the bank's ownership structure. As a whole, better disclosure is associated with lower 
                                                 
12 For the sake of brevity, we do not report the obtained results but they are available on request. 
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risk but its impact is stronger in the presence of block holders and also institutional 
investors as shareholders than the presence of the government or insiders. We 
decompose the disclosure index into six subindices and find that disclosure on certain 
items of the balance sheet (loans, other earning assets, deposits,), memo lines (loan loss 
reserves, capital ratio, contingent liabilities, & Off-balance sheetand the income 
statement (non-interest income and loan loss provisions) plays an important role in 
mitigating risk especially regarding default risk and volatility of bank returns. 
Compared to others, the disclosure on other-funding items (money market funding and 
long-term funding), however, plays a much less significant role in attenuating risk.   
Our results support policies aiming to enhance transparency, disclosure 
requirements, and market discipline in the banking industry. But we also show that the 
benefits of disclosure are dependent on banks' internal governance mechanisms and 
more specifically their ownership structure. Since the banking sector in Asia is 
characterized by concentrated ownership and often inadequate corporate governance 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013), our results shed light on the 
importance of carefully emphasising disclosure but also good governance practices in 
such a banking environment. Specifically, disclosure might be useful to mitigate 
possible expropriation/tunnelling activities by controlling shareholders. Nevertheless, 
drawing any lesson on how better disclosure will impact bank risk is too early since 
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Table 1. Summary statistics: bank risk, disclosure and other variables for the 2004-2010 period  
 
Z-score Zscore1 Z-score2 NPL-to-Cap SDROA SDROE DI Insider Inst Gown Block HHI PBV Size (mil) Tier1 Growth Int Inf Covdep 
Mean 81.22 6.40 74.97 0.69 0.475 5.68 65.10 0.65 51.05 10.68 39.48 19.28 1.27 44413 10.49 5.24 3.34 3.85 1.80 
Std.Dev. 154.26 12.24 146.14 0.93 2.14 7.95 17.36 4.27 29.44 23.91 33.86 24.60 0.99 133797.8 5.20 3.03 1.93 3.73 1.43 
Min -40.27 -12.97 0 0.005 0.004 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 1 0.81 0.2 -0.14 0.01 0 
Max 2503.32 215.29 2454.3 17.27 43.71 71.06 95.20 49.67 100 100 100 100 11.38 1723728 52.12 14.7 13.11 23.12 6.67 
Obs 1421 1424 1419 1377 1436 1397 1449 1437 1318 1331 1322 1310 1188 1402 1362 1451 1451 1451 1433 
Z-score = (ROA+Equity-to-Assets)/SDROA, Z-score1=ROA divided by SDROA, Zscore2= EA divided by SDROA, NPLtoCap = ratio of non-performing loan to gross loan divided by 
ratio of capital asset to total assets, SDROA = the standard deviation of return on average assets based on three previous years data (%), SDROE = standard deviation of return on equity 
(%), Insider = insider ownership (%), Inst = institutional ownership (%), Gown = government ownership (%), Block = block ownership (%), HHI = ownership concentration as the 
Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of the ownerhips (%), DI= disclosure index (%), Tier1= tier 1 capital ratio (%), PBV= market to book value ratio, Size= total assets (TA) is in million 




Table 2. Bank risk, disclosure and other variables on average over the 2004-2010 period by country 
Country Z-score Z-score1 Zscore2 NPL-to-Cap SDROA SDROE DI Insider Inst Gown Block HHI PBV Size (mil) Tier1 Growth Int Inf Covdep 
China 61.27 8.95 51.41 0.92 0.17 4.92 78.27 0.00 64.04 13.62 53.40 21.48 1.99 397948.9 8.91 11.03 2.25 3.38 0.00 
Indonesia 55.94 6.08 49.82 0.61 1.25 5.44 56.93 0.32 74.81 14.44 77.53 40.66 1.83 5972.502 14.65 5.60 3.74 8.36 4.59 
India 73.58 10.17 63.42 0.40 0.28 5.10 54.23 1.41 64.22 34.28 53.90 33.62 1.36 23086.88 9.32 8.24 4.94 7.33 1.63 
Japan 96.40 4.12 92.27 0.81 0.32 5.58 67.61 0.04 24.95 0.00 8.73 3.24 1.02 33355.31 9.13 2.63 2.69 0.67 1.07 
S-Korea 51.60 4.72 46.89 0.15 0.30 5.05 76.30 3.57 66.55 12.38 53.88 25.80 1.29 41210.48 8.83 3.92 4.59 3.08 1.29 
Malaysia 156.01 23.39 132.61 0.42 0.14 2.25 74.60 0.07 69.11 15.01 51.85 19.46 2.21 46513.2 11.90 5.44 3.16 2.55 2.53 
Philippines 96.91 6.11 90.71 0.99 0.48 2.85 70.11 2.57 67.87 1.91 64.91 20.87 1.09 5768.138 13.87 5.16 3.96 5.58 2.15 
Singapore 101.07 8.94 92.13 0.31 0.19 2.13 80.05 0.65 71.95 0.00 46.94 7.54 1.14 79015.47 13.77 8.26 3.73 2.16 1.25 
Thailand 92.57 9.37 83.21 1.16 0.77 8.46 80.89 0.14 64.80 4.37 50.12 25.03 1.10 19995.26 12.24 4.76 3.10 3.40 4.00 
Taiwan 59.08 0.84 56.73 0.31 0.83 12.69 58.31 0.00 50.99 7.37 29.75 11.01 1.02 13960.03 9.98 4.91 1.63 1.54 0.65 
Vietnam 48.23 6.32 41.90 0.34 0.40 5.08 54.59 2.84 48.10 0.00 41.38 20.49 1.30 6933.989 15.06 7.34 3.44 10.53 2.07 
Z-score = (ROA+Equity-to-Assets)/SDROA, Z-score1=ROA divided by SDROA, Zscore2= EA divided by SDROA, NPL-to-Cap = ratio of non-performing loan to gross loan divided 
by ratio of capital asset to total assets, SDROA = the standard deviation of return on average assets based on two previous years data (%), SDROE = standard deviation of return on 
equity (%), Insider = insider ownership (%), Inst = institutional ownership (%), Gown = government ownership (%), Block = block ownership (%), HHI = ownership concentration as 
the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of the ownerhips (%), DI= disclosure index (%), Tier1= tier 1 capital ratio (%), PBV= market to book value ratio, Size= total assets (TA) is in 
million US$, Covdep= ln(1+coverage of insurance deposit), Growth= growth of gross domestic product, Interest= real interest rate p.a (%), Inflation = inflation rate p.a (%). The 
numbers for each country are average measures. 
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Table 3. Disclosure index by country and by year (in percentage) 
Panel A. Disclosure by country
Country Mean Std.Dev. Min Median Max Obs
China 78.27 20.26 0 85.7 95.20 94
Indonesia 56.93 20.44 0 61.9 81.00 180
India 54.23 16.39 0 57.1 85.70 270
Japan 67.61 5.59 0 66.7 76.20 544
S-Korea 76.30 8.76 47.60 76.20 95.20 42
Malaysia 74.60 2.32 71.40 76.20 76.20 21
Philippines 70.11 20.34 0 76.2 95.20 90
Singapore 80.05 19.54 38.10 90.50 95.20 21
Thailand 80.89 12.98 42.90 85.70 95.20 77
Taiwan 58.31 26.81 0 66.7 85.70 82
Vietnam 54.59 20.59 0 59.5 71.40 28
Total 65.10 17.36 0 66.7 95.20 1449
Panel B. Evolution of disclosure
Year Mean Std.Dev. Min Median Max Obs
2004 58.53 19.73 0 66.7 95.20 206
2005 61.67 18.14 0 66.7 95.20 206
2006 65.03 15.75 0 66.7 95.20 206
2007 66.53 16.45 0 66.7 95.20 209
2008 69.86 14.57 0 71.4 95.20 209
2009 69.14 14.72 0 71.4 95.20 206
2010 64.83 18.88 0 66.7 95.20 207





Table 4. Correlation matrix of bank risk, disclosure and other variables (2004-2010) 
Z-score Z-score 1 Z-score 2 NPL-to-Cap SDROA SDROE DI Insider Inst Gown Block HHI PBV Size Tier1 Growth Interest Inflation
Zscore 1
Zscore1 0.7893* 1
Zscore2 0.9885* 0.7577* 1
NPL-to-Cap -0.1295* -0.2253* -0.1144* 1
SDROA -0.9087* -0.6643* -0.9274* -0.0226 1
SDROE -0.7579* -0.5420* -0.7630* 0.0532* 0.7068* 1
Disclosure (DI) 0.0386 0.0269 0.0439 0.0488* -0.0564* -0.0720* 1
Insider -0.0381 -0.0084 -0.0471* -0.1379* 0.0985* 0.0274 -0.0042 1
Inst -0.0225 0.0743* -0.0376 -0.2063* 0.1812* -0.0034 0.1547* 0.0358 1
Gown -0.0390 0.1154* -0.0646* -0.0851* 0.0305 0.0737* -0.1598* -0.0573* -0.3409* 1
Block -0.0620* 0.1486* -0.0999* -0.2535* 0.2248* 0.0822* -0.0252 0.0658* 0.5977* 0.4380* 1
HHI -0.0402 0.1143* -0.0711* -0.1507* 0.1403* 0.0824* -0.1087* 0.0178 0.3326* 0.4925* 0.7512* 1
PBV -0.0631* 0.1303* -0.0942* -0.2194* 0.1495* 0.0577* 0.0134 0.0821* 0.2403* 0.0158 0.2711* 0.2017* 1
Size 0.0781* 0.0873* 0.0777* 0.0419 -0.2081* -0.0670* 0.3262* -0.0419 -0.2429* 0.1195* -0.2741* -0.2469* 0.0144 1
Tier1 0.1594* 0.1299* 0.1466* -0.2800* 0.1275* -0.1630* -0.0382 0.0773* 0.2799* -0.0653* 0.2857* 0.1822* 0.0918* -0.3799* 1
Growth -0.0426 0.1935* -0.0797* -0.2982* 0.1223* 0.0821* -0.0524* 0.0474* 0.1674* 0.3232* 0.4325* 0.3530* 0.2059* -0.0136 0.1011* 1
Interest 0.0857* 0.1856* 0.0603* -0.1546* -0.0157 -0.0486* -0.0739* 0.1105* 0.0393 0.2519* 0.2524* 0.2390* 0.0739* -0.0948* 0.0774* 0.1526* 1
Inflation -0.0381 0.1697* -0.0754* -0.3348* 0.2038* 0.0439 -0.1645* 0.1116* 0.2428* 0.3288* 0.5664* 0.4622* 0.1498* -0.3773* 0.3650* 0.4660* 0.2106* 1
Covdep -0.0533* 0.0419 -0.0784* -0.0113 0.2415* 0.0236 -0.1213* -0.0005 0.3374* 0.0921* 0.4796* 0.3838* 0.1811* -0.4899* 0.4506* 0.0491* 0.1525* 0.4755*  
Variables are computed over the 2004-2010 period. Z-score =  (ROA+Equity-to-Assets)/SDROA, Z-score1=ROA divided by SDROA, Z-score2= EA divided by SDROA, NPL-to-Cap = ratio of non-performing 
loan to gross loan divided by ratio of capital asset to total assets, SDROA = the standard deviation of ROA based on three years data, SDROE = standard deviation of return on equity, Insider = insider 
ownership, Inst = institutional ownership, Gown = government ownership, Block = block ownership, HHI = ownership concentration as the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of the ownerhips, Disclosure 
(DI)= disclosure index, Tier1= tier 1 capital ratio, PBV= market to book value ratio, Size= natural log. of total assets (TA), Covdep= ln(1+coverage of insurance deposit), Growth= growth of gross domestic 
product, Interest= real interest rate per annum, Inflation = inflation rate p.a. Superscripts * denotes statistical significant at the 0.10 levels or smaller. 
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Table 5 The impact of disclosure on bank risk: Baseline IV-models 
Dep. Var
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4)   
DI 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.102*** 0.0710*** 0.0714*** 0.0712*** 0.0700*** 0.0998*** 0.0990*** 0.101*** 0.0975*** -0.000726 -0.000923 -0.00102 0.000379   -0.0881*** -0.0870*** -0.0890*** -0.0858*** -0.0555*** -0.0550***-0.0562***-0.0559***
(5.34) (5.46) (5.40) (5.33)   (3.91) (3.95) (3.91) (3.81)   (5.26) (5.40) (5.32) (5.25)   (-0.10) (-0.13) (-0.14) (0.05)   (-5.02) (-5.14) (-5.11) (-5.01)   (-3.28) (-3.47) (-3.34) (-3.35)   
Insiders 0.0103 0.0102 0.00979 0.0100   0.0294*** 0.0298*** 0.0291*** 0.0296*** 0.0101 0.0101 0.00958 0.00993   0.00482 0.00470 0.00466 0.00506   -0.0124 -0.0124 -0.0118 -0.0123   -0.00850 -0.00846 -0.00813 -0.00831   
(0.43) (0.42) (0.41) (0.42)   (3.06) (3.05) (3.02) (3.06)   (0.40) (0.40) (0.38) (0.40)   (0.90) (0.87) (0.87) (0.96)   (-0.49) (-0.49) (-0.47) (-0.49)   (-0.33) (-0.33) (-0.32) (-0.32)   
Inst -0.00264                -0.00375                -0.00294                0.000192                0.00320                0.00283                
(-0.76)                (-1.10)                (-0.90)                (0.16)                (1.03)                (0.91)                
Gown -0.0216**                -0.0196*                -0.0207**                -0.00879***                0.0204**                0.0117                
(-2.36)                (-1.93)                (-2.31)                (-3.60)                (2.38)                (1.48)                
Block -0.00820*                -0.00756**                -0.00867**                -0.000710                0.00931**                0.00675*                
(-1.93)                (-2.14)                (-2.16)                (-0.56)                (2.41)                (1.75)                
HHI -0.00531   -0.00618   -0.00569   -0.00187   0.00637   0.00138   
(-0.87)   (-1.11)   (-0.97)   (-0.71)   (1.17)   (0.29)   
PBV -0.0214 -0.0394 -0.0321 -0.0295   0.0786 0.0592 0.0660 0.0646   -0.0135 -0.0312 -0.0247 -0.0223   0.0211 0.00959 0.0211 0.0196   -0.00835 0.0104 0.00351 0.00111   -0.0139 -0.00944 -0.00462 -0.0115   
(-0.35) (-0.66) (-0.52) (-0.49)   (1.05) (0.82) (0.89) (0.87)   (-0.23) (-0.54) (-0.41) (-0.38)   (0.63) (0.29) (0.63) (0.57)   (-0.15) (0.19) (0.06) (0.02)   (-0.29) (-0.20) (-0.10) (-0.24)   
Size 0.0479 0.0491 0.0447 0.0467   0.0449 0.0441 0.0425 0.0447   0.0459 0.0466 0.0423 0.0443   0.0318 0.0330 0.0318 0.0321   -0.0543 -0.0546 -0.0504 -0.0529   -0.0787 -0.0785 -0.0752 -0.0824   
(0.56) (0.58) (0.53) (0.56)   (0.63) (0.62) (0.60) (0.63)   (0.56) (0.58) (0.52) (0.56)   (0.81) (0.84) (0.81) (0.83)   (-0.76) (-0.78) (-0.72) (-0.76)   (-1.12) (-1.13) (-1.08) (-1.17)   
Tier1 0.0461* 0.0467* 0.0478* 0.0482*  0.00782 0.00882 0.00804 0.0112   0.0409* 0.0415* 0.0426* 0.0431*  -0.00754 -0.00813 -0.00781 -0.00692   0.00109 0.000501 -0.000691 -0.00134   -0.0186 -0.0192 -0.0201 -0.0183   
(1.82) (1.87) (1.89) (1.92)   (0.29) (0.33) (0.30) (0.42)   (1.69) (1.73) (1.76) (1.79)   (-0.82) (-0.88) (-0.85) (-0.75)   (0.05) (0.02) (-0.03) (-0.06)   (-0.95) (-0.98) (-1.02) (-0.92)   
Growth -0.0712** -0.0695** -0.0714** -0.0681** -0.0844*** -0.0831*** -0.0838*** -0.0803** -0.0682** -0.0665** -0.0683** -0.0648** 0.0302*** 0.0321*** 0.0305*** 0.0313*** 0.0633** 0.0613** 0.0632** 0.0595** 0.0761*** 0.0754*** 0.0760*** 0.0741** 
(-2.36) (-2.35) (-2.38) (-2.24)   (-2.74) (-2.73) (-2.75) (-2.56)   (-2.35) (-2.33) (-2.37) (-2.21)   (2.91) (3.09) (2.94) (2.94)   (2.31) (2.28) (2.32) (2.15)   (2.61) (2.60) (2.63) (2.50)   
Interest 0.0445 0.0517* 0.0456 0.0442   0.0633* 0.0702** 0.0645** 0.0646*  0.0432 0.0502* 0.0444 0.0429   0.0144 0.0172 0.0144 0.0153   -0.0456 -0.0525* -0.0468 -0.0453   -0.0224 -0.0261 -0.0232 -0.0240   
(1.38) (1.68) (1.41) (1.38)   (1.92) (2.30) (1.98) (1.96)   (1.39) (1.69) (1.43) (1.39)   (1.29) (1.56) (1.29) (1.36)   (-1.56) (-1.89) (-1.61) (-1.56)   (-0.88) (-1.07) (-0.92) (-0.95)   
Inflation -0.0456 -0.0418 -0.0488 -0.0489*  -0.0199 -0.0167 -0.0226 -0.0237   -0.0442 -0.0403 -0.0475 -0.0478*  0.00437 0.00429 0.00407 0.00315   0.0315 0.0278 0.0351 0.0356   0.0453* 0.0417* 0.0478* 0.0437*  
(-1.54) (-1.46) (-1.63) (-1.65)   (-0.68) (-0.58) (-0.77) (-0.79)   (-1.53) (-1.45) (-1.63) (-1.65)   (0.40) (0.40) (0.37) (0.28)   (1.16) (1.06) (1.28) (1.31)   (1.79) (1.70) (1.87) (1.70)   
Covdep -0.168** -0.147** -0.161** -0.166** -0.194*** -0.173** -0.186*** -0.191*** -0.162** -0.142** -0.154** -0.160** 0.0318 0.0413 0.0329 0.0338   0.146** 0.126* 0.138** 0.143** 0.182*** 0.169** 0.175** 0.180***
(-2.31) (-2.00) (-2.21) (-2.30)   (-2.69) (-2.35) (-2.58) (-2.63)   (-2.31) (-2.01) (-2.20) (-2.29)   (1.18) (1.51) (1.21) (1.24)   (2.22) (1.91) (2.10) (2.20)   (2.65) (2.45) (2.57) (2.59)   
N 965 970 969 962   886 890 889 884   965 970 969 962   963 968 967 960   965 970 969 962   952 957 956 950  
F-stat 7.7487 8.1976 7.9523 7.3638 7.1001 7.5552 7.4833 6.9530 7.7291 8.2068 7.9603 7.3561 13.3714 14.5107 13.0349 14.6753 6.9077 7.4285 7.1785 6.6185 6.7737 7.0781 7.1785 6.6185 
Hansen J 
stat.(overid. test)
0.002 0.017 0.001 0.000 0.045 0.116 0.067 0.043 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.316 0.418 0.282 0.303 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.612 0.678 0.622 0.677
Endogeneity test, 
Chi-sq: DI
32.267*** 32.321*** 32.395*** 30.818*** 13.733*** 13.979*** 13.495*** 13.023*** 29.959*** 29.998*** 29.983*** 28.546*** 0.075 0.130 0.100 0.020 27.201*** 27.020*** 27.329*** 25.950*** 10.139*** 10.980*** 10.341*** 10.308***
SDROEZ-score Z-score 2Z-score 1 NPL to Cap SDROA
Table 5 reports the regression of bank risk on disclosure using the instrument variables (IV models). T-statistics are in parentheses and corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Explanatory variables are disclosure index (DI), insider ownerships 
(Insider), institutional ownerships (Inst), block ownerships (Block), Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and control variables  (PBV, Size, tier 1 capital ratio, coverage of insurance deposits, GDP growth, interest rate, inflation). Z-score =  (ROA+Equity-to-Assets)/SDROA, 
Z-score 1=ROA divided by SDROA, Z-score 2= EA divided by SDROA, NPL-to-Cap = ratio of non-performing loan to gross loan divided by ratio of capital asset to total assets (TA), SDROA = the standard deviation of ROA based on two previous years data, SDROE = 
standard deviation of return on equity, Insider = insider ownership, Inst = institutional ownership, Gown = government ownership, Block = block ownership, HHI = ownership concentration as the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of the ownerhips, Disclosure (DI)= 
disclosure index, Tier1= tier 1 capital ratio, PBV= market to book value ratio, Size= natural log. of total assets, Covdep= ln(1+coverage of insurance deposit), Growth= growth of gross domestic product, Interest= real interest rate per annum, Inflation = inflation rate p.a. The 








Table 6. The combined impact of disclosure and ownership on bank risk: Augmented IV-models  
Dep. Var
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DI 0.103*** 0.219*** 0.125*** 0.289*** 0.180*** 0.0677*** 0.161*** 0.0836*** 0.194*** 0.116*** 0.0981*** 0.208*** 0.118*** 0.274*** 0.170***
(5.57) (3.49) (5.20) (3.02) (3.91) (3.84) (2.81) (3.84) (3.05) (3.45) (5.49) (3.46) (5.10) (2.99) (3.82)
Insiders 0.214** 0.117 0.198**
(2.54) (1.48) (2.42)
DIxInsiders -0.00261** -0.00115 -0.00241**
(-2.29) (-1.16) (-2.16)
Inst 0.187*** 0.136** 0.176***
(2.99) (2.42) (2.94)
DIxInst -0.00268*** -0.00198** -0.00253***
(-2.98) (-2.47) (-2.94)
Gown 0.0948*** 0.0536** 0.0882***
(3.11) (2.00) (2.99)
DIxGown -0.00165*** -0.00104*** -0.00155***
(-3.92) (-2.79) (-3.79)
Block 0.244** 0.165*** 0.229**
(2.54) (2.63) (2.49)
DIxBlock -0.00366*** -0.00246*** -0.00344***
(-2.69) (-2.75) (-2.64)
HHI 0.244*** 0.151*** 0.228***
(3.04) (2.78) (2.95)
DIxHHI -0.00374*** -0.00235*** -0.00350***
(-3.09) (-2.86) (-3.00)
PBV -0.0299 -0.115 -0.0130 -0.108 0.0215 0.0802 -0.00655 0.0763 0.0232 0.0939 -0.0234 -0.102 -0.00642 -0.0966 0.0258
(-0.50) (-1.34) (-0.22) (-1.37) (0.34) (1.11) (-0.07) (1.08) (0.29) (1.30) (-0.40) (-1.24) (-0.11) (-1.26) (0.42)
Size 0.0366 0.0432 0.100 0.269* 0.163 0.0359 0.0582 0.0691 0.133 0.117 0.0346 0.0414 0.0943 0.253* 0.153
(0.44) (0.42) (0.95) (1.70) (1.27) (0.52) (0.72) (0.86) (1.27) (1.33) (0.44) (0.43) (0.95) (1.68) (1.26)
Tier1 0.0524** 0.0494* 0.0299 0.0430 0.0408 0.0109 0.0122 -0.00215 0.00215 0.00755 0.0468** 0.0440* 0.0258 0.0381 0.0362
(2.11) (1.77) (1.18) (1.55) (1.62) (0.42) (0.43) (-0.08) (0.08) (0.30) (1.96) (1.66) (1.06) (1.44) (1.50)
Growth -0.0750** -0.0736** -0.0811*** -0.0773** -0.0708** -0.0900*** -0.0851** -0.0930*** -0.0899*** -0.0872*** -0.0716** -0.0705** -0.0774*** -0.0738** -0.0676**
(-2.57) (-2.05) (-2.81) (-2.17) (-2.15) (-3.01) (-2.46) (-3.09) (-2.80) (-2.71) (-2.54) (-2.05) (-2.78) (-2.17) (-2.13)
Interest 0.0459 0.0380 0.0546* 0.0542 0.0554* 0.0650** 0.0534 0.0713** 0.0597* 0.0665** 0.0453 0.0371 0.0529* 0.0524 0.0535*
(1.54) (0.89) (1.90) (1.40) (1.70) (2.13) (1.31) (2.47) (1.65) (2.09) (1.58) (0.91) (1.90) (1.41) (1.71)
Inflation -0.0368 -0.0929* -0.0143 -0.0831* 0.00173 -0.0110 -0.0661 0.00217 -0.0490 0.00807 -0.0350 -0.0888* -0.0145 -0.0798* 0.0000454
(-1.27) (-1.95) (-0.52) (-1.88) (0.06) (-0.39) (-1.40) (0.08) (-1.26) (0.30) (-1.25) (-1.94) (-0.55) (-1.87) (0.00)
Covdep -0.181** -0.226*** -0.133* -0.272*** -0.253*** -0.207*** -0.220*** -0.163** -0.234*** -0.237*** -0.174** -0.217*** -0.129* -0.258*** -0.241***
(-2.49) (-2.62) (-1.75) (-3.56) (-3.29) (-2.87) (-2.71) (-2.17) (-3.39) (-3.28) (-2.49) (-2.63) (-1.76) (-3.55) (-3.28)
No. Obs 1025 966 971 970 963 937 887 891 890 885 1025 966 971 970 963
F-stat 9.057*** 6.423*** 8.070*** 4.604*** 5.812*** 8.046*** 5.638*** 7.643*** 5.785*** 6.275*** 9.044*** 6.453*** 8.149*** 4.747*** 5.899***
Underid. test, Chi-sq(2): 41.14*** 15.68*** 35.45*** 20.42*** 23.34*** 40.76*** 14.421*** 34.615*** 18.073*** 28.153*** 41.14*** 15.58*** 35.46*** 20.42*** 23.34***
Hansen J-stat (overid. 
test)
0.03 0.19 0.15 0.09 3.13* 0.025 0.106 0.196 1.451 2.277 0.04 0.21 0.168 0.08 3.12*
Endog. test, Chi-sq: DI 34.08*** 32.08*** 32.28*** 31.33*** 25.30*** 13.467*** 14.276*** 15.015*** 12.461*** 11.304*** 31.74*** 29.77*** 29.89*** 29.18*** 23.41***
Sum of coefficients: 0.1004 0.2163 0.1234 0.2853 0.1763 0.0666 0.1590 0.0826 0.1915 0.1137 0.0957 0.2055 0.1165 0.2706 0.1665
Significance test
DI + DIxIown 30.92*** 15.04*** 30.15***
DI + DIxInst 12.19*** 7.92*** 12.01***
DI + DIxGown 27.16*** 14.88*** 26.22***
DI + DIxBlock 9.17*** 9.32*** 8.94***
DI + DIxHHI 15.41*** 12.01*** 14.72***
Z score Z score 2Z score 1
 
Table 6 reports the regression using the instrument variable models. T-statistics are in parentheses and corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Explanatory variables are disclosure index (DI), insider 
ownerships (Insider), institutional ownerships (Inst), block ownerships (Block), Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and control variables (PBV, Size, Tier 1 capital ratio, coverage of insurance deposits, GDP growth, interest rate, 
inflation). We also include interaction terms between disclosure and insider ownerships (DIxInsiders), institution ownerships (DIxinst), governerment ownerships (DIxgown), block ownerships (DIxblock), ownership concentration 
(DIxHHi) and the control variables.  Z-score =  (ROA+Equity-to-Assets)/SDROA, Z-score 1=ROA divided by SDROA, Z-score 2= EA divided by SDROA.  The values of dependent variables, Z-score, Z-score 1, Z-score 2 are in 
natural logarithm. Significance test is the tests of the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of disclosure and the interaction terms do not have joint impacts on risk. Independent variables are in decimals except described 
otherwise. Superscripts ***, **, and * denotes statistical significant at the .01, .05 and .10 levels respectively. 
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Table 6. The combined impact of disclosure and ownership on bank risk: Augmented IV-models (cont’d) 
Dep. Variables
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DI -0.000968 -0.00527 -0.000376 -0.00502 0.000682 -0.0855*** -0.189*** -0.103*** -0.244*** -0.151*** -0.0573*** -0.124*** -0.0673*** -0.140** -0.112***
(-0.13) (-0.33) (-0.05) (-0.24) (0.05) (-5.24) (-3.41) (-4.85) (-2.86) (-3.65) (-3.56) (-2.64) (-3.41) (-2.26) (-2.85)
Insiders -0.0415 -0.168** -0.0541
(-1.33) (-2.12) (-0.74)
DIxInsiders 0.000556 0.00200* 0.000587
(1.42) (1.87) (0.60)
Inst -0.00723 -0.164*** -0.109**
(-0.50) (-2.96) (-2.34)
DIxInst 0.000105 0.00236*** 0.00159**
(0.50) (2.97) (2.36)
Gown -0.0117 -0.0722*** -0.0475**
(-1.17) (-2.63) (-1.98)
DIxGown 0.0000411 0.00132*** 0.000841**
(0.29) (3.49) (2.48)
Block -0.00892 -0.203** -0.116*
(-0.45) (-2.37) (-1.90)
DIxBlock 0.000115 0.00307** 0.00177**
(0.40) (2.54) (2.01)





PBV 0.0257 0.0244 0.00815 0.0217 0.0171 0.00285 0.0742 -0.0105 0.0681 -0.0422 -0.0313 0.0470 -0.0203 0.0355 -0.0397
(0.79) (0.69) (0.25) (0.64) (0.51) (0.05) (0.98) (-0.20) (0.98) (-0.73) (-0.62) (0.74) (-0.43) (0.61) (-0.77)
Size 0.0196 0.0309 0.0324 0.0278 0.0303 -0.0420 -0.0502 -0.0952 -0.239* -0.150 -0.0534 -0.0779 -0.106 -0.182* -0.161
(0.51) (0.78) (0.82) (0.65) (0.73) (-0.61) (-0.61) (-1.11) (-1.81) (-1.41) (-0.72) (-0.94) (-1.33) (-1.72) (-1.52)
Tier1 -0.0138 -0.00797 -0.00790 -0.00772 -0.00686 -0.00125 -0.00162 0.0141 0.00349 0.00517 -0.0121 -0.0198 -0.0104 -0.0162 -0.0140
(-1.50) (-0.85) (-0.87) (-0.83) (-0.75) (-0.06) (-0.07) (0.64) (0.15) (0.24) (-0.61) (-0.93) (-0.53) (-0.81) (-0.68)
Growth 0.0267*** 0.0298*** 0.0321*** 0.0305*** 0.0316*** 0.0666** 0.0658** 0.0711*** 0.0684** 0.0626** 0.0835*** 0.0759** 0.0805*** 0.0798*** 0.0712**
(2.65) (2.90) (3.16) (2.96) (2.97) (2.51) (2.04) (2.70) (2.15) (2.10) (2.89) (2.46) (2.80) (2.71) (2.25)
Interest 0.00731 0.0149 0.0166 0.0135 0.0145 -0.0464* -0.0399 -0.0548** -0.0539 -0.0548* -0.0137 -0.0174 -0.0276 -0.0274 -0.0299
(0.68) (1.30) (1.53) (1.24) (1.30) (-1.73) (-1.05) (-2.09) (-1.58) (-1.89) (-0.57) (-0.57) (-1.18) (-1.03) (-1.13)
Inflation 0.00259 0.00640 0.00331 0.00428 0.00112 0.0224 0.0730* 0.00554 0.0640 -0.00777 0.0421* 0.0756** 0.0286 0.0626* 0.0166
(0.24) (0.50) (0.32) (0.36) (0.11) (0.85) (1.72) (0.22) (1.62) (-0.30) (1.68) (2.01) (1.22) (1.90) (0.67)
Covdep 0.0408 0.0342 0.0413 0.0370 0.0367 0.154** 0.197*** 0.116* 0.230*** 0.216*** 0.173** 0.214*** 0.161** 0.232*** 0.228***
(1.53) (1.32) (1.50) (1.44) (1.41) (2.38) (2.59) (1.69) (3.42) (3.12) (2.50) (2.95) (2.28) (3.54) (3.09)
No. obs. 1023 964 969 968 961 1025 966 971 970 963 1006 953 958 957 951
F-stat 17.180*** 13.187*** 14.881*** 13.519*** 15.496*** 7.934*** 5.631*** 7.669*** 4.378*** 5.437*** 7.035*** 5.519*** 7.424*** 6.022*** 5.546***
Underid. test, Chi-sq(2): 46.883*** 20.487*** 39.940*** 26.069*** 34.961*** 41.140*** 15.581*** 35.455*** 20.418*** 23.345*** 40.382*** 15.785*** 35.335*** 21.549*** 23.448***
Hansen J-stat (overid. test) 0.187 0.307 0.548 0.533 0.569 0.067 0.243 0.138 0.064 2.729* 0.042 0.162 0.173 0.466 0.221
Endogeneity test, Chi-sq: DI 0.028 0.090 0.045 0.001 0.056 28.806*** 27.163*** 27.369*** 26.749*** 21.032*** 12.890*** 11.090*** 12.463*** 8.534*** 11.810***
Sum of coefficients: -0.0004 -0.0052 -0.0003 -0.0049 0.0008 -0.0835 -0.1866 -0.1017 -0.2409 -0.1479 -0.0567 -0.1224 -0.0665 -0.1382 -0.1096
Significance test:
DI + DIxIown 0.00 27.75*** 13.15***
DI + DIxInst 0.11 11.68*** 7.00***
DI + DIxGown 0.00 23.71*** 11.71***
DI + DIxBlock 0.06 8.19*** 5.12**
DI + DIxHHI 0.00 13.43*** 8.19***
NPL to Cap SDROA SDROE
 
Table 6 reports the regression using the instrument variables (IV-models). T-statistics are in parentheses and corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Explanatory variables are disclosure index (DI), 
insider ownerships (Insider), institutional ownerships (Inst), block ownerships (Block), Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and control variables (PBV, Size, Tier 1 capital ratio, coverage of insurance deposits, GDP 
growth, interest rate, inflation). We also include interaction terms between disclosure and insider ownerships (DIxInsiders), institution ownerships (DIxInst), governerment ownerships (DIxgown), block ownerships 
(DIxblock), ownership concentration (DIxHHi) and the control variables. NPL-to-Cap = ratio of non-performing loan to gross loan divided by ratio of capital asset to total assets, SDROA = the standard deviation of ROA 
based on two previous years data, SDROE = standard deviation of return on equity. The values of dependent variables NPL to Cap, SDROA and SDROE are in natural logarithm. Significance test is the test of the null 
hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of disclosure and the interaction term do not have joint impacts on risk. Independent variables are in decimals except described otherwise. Superscripts ***, **, and * denotes 





Table 7. Decomposing disclosure: Impact of disclosure components on risk 
Dep. Var
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
DILoan 0.0848***                0.0648***                0.0810***                
(5.14)                (3.70)                (5.13)                
DIEA 0.0331***                0.0269***                0.0311***                
(5.32)                (3.51)                (4.99)                
DIDep 0.113***                0.0918***                0.108***                
(3.76)                (2.73)                (3.79)                
DIFund 0.122*                -0.0668                0.0699*                
(1.65)                (-0.74)                (1.95)                
DIMemo 0.0657***                0.0547***                0.0628***                
(5.37)                (3.62)                (5.35)                
DIIS 0.131*** 0.120** 0.125***
(2.90)   (2.32)   (2.90)   
PBV 0.0153 0.0190 0.0860 -0.169 -0.0248 -0.125   0.123 0.0934 0.203** 0.297 0.0871 0.00477   0.0196 0.0272 0.0871 -0.0668 -0.0188 -0.115   
(0.22) (0.34) (0.89) (-0.97) (-0.38) (-1.20)   (1.59) (1.23) (2.01) (1.46) (1.17) (0.05)   (0.29) (0.49) (0.94) (-0.73) (-0.29) (-1.13)   
Size -0.105 -0.0148 -0.243 -0.0876 -0.102 -0.140   -0.0287 0.0275 -0.134 0.0522 -0.0403 -0.0628   -0.100 -0.00825 -0.232 -0.0571 -0.0980 -0.134   
(-1.42) (-0.20) (-1.51) (-0.48) (-1.31) (-0.97)   (-0.36) (0.35) (-0.88) (0.59) (-0.55) (-0.89)   (-1.39) (-0.11) (-1.52) (-0.48) (-1.29) (-0.95)   
Tier1 0.0488* 0.0254 0.0923** 0.140* 0.0104 0.0180   0.0180 -0.00159 0.0576 -0.0615 -0.0110 -0.00564   0.0434* 0.0191 0.0851** 0.0888** 0.00682 0.0140   
(1.77) (1.05) (2.18) (1.85) (0.41) (0.56)   (0.63) (-0.06) (1.28) (-0.72) (-0.41) (-0.18)   (1.65) (0.80) (2.11) (2.16) (0.28) (0.46)   
Growth -0.0651* -0.107*** -0.108*** -0.200*** -0.0792*** -0.101*** -0.0727** -0.105*** -0.0947** -0.0901* -0.0768** -0.0877** -0.0623* -0.0975*** -0.103*** -0.162*** -0.0757*** -0.0966***
(-1.95) (-3.65) (-2.77) (-2.82) (-2.66) (-2.77)   (-2.21) (-3.31) (-2.50) (-1.93) (-2.41) (-2.18)   (-1.94) (-3.35) (-2.76) (-3.41) (-2.64) (-2.75)   
Interest 0.0655* 0.0243 0.131*** 0.0859 0.0312 0.0519   0.0819** 0.0458 0.146*** 0.0586 0.0524 0.0840*  0.0640** 0.0254 0.126*** 0.0718* 0.0312 0.0510   
(1.95) (0.93) (2.99) (1.40) (0.94) (0.98)   (2.47) (1.43) (3.34) (1.39) (1.62) (1.91)   (1.97) (0.95) (3.01) (1.76) (0.98) (1.00)   
Inflation 0.0101 -0.0143 0.0586 -0.0573 -0.0551 -0.0807   0.0193 -0.00927 0.0641* 0.0877 -0.0394 -0.0576   0.00990 -0.0155 0.0562 -0.0222 -0.0524 -0.0770   
(0.35) (-0.61) (1.64) (-0.78) (-1.63) (-1.34)   (0.71) (-0.35) (1.94) (1.13) (-1.11) (-1.02)   (0.36) (-0.66) (1.63) (-0.55) (-1.60) (-1.32)   
Covdep -0.271*** -0.182*** -0.244*** -0.336** -0.0735 -0.268*** -0.296*** -0.190*** -0.295*** -0.207** -0.114 -0.298*** -0.260*** -0.169*** -0.234*** -0.286*** -0.0713 -0.257***
(-4.02) (-2.76) (-2.59) (-2.57) (-0.93) (-2.65)   (-4.22) (-2.63) (-3.21) (-2.13) (-1.35) (-3.01)   (-4.00) (-2.64) (-2.59) (-3.16) (-0.93) (-2.64)   
No. obs 1027 1027 1027 963 1027 1027   939 885 939 880 939 939   1027 963 1027 957 1027 1027   
F-stat 10.02*** 8.46*** 8.30*** 1.23*** 10.63*** 7.65*** 8.31*** 6.78*** 7.29*** 3.55*** 8.75*** 7.11*** 9.99*** 6.88*** 8.33*** 2.39*** 10.73*** 7.64***
Underid.test, Chi-sq(2): 32.025*** 62.103*** 15.326*** 3.566 30.174*** 10.444*** 33.114*** 56.113*** 12.793*** 2.660 29.927*** 6.534** 32.025*** 58.708*** 15.326*** 7.313* 30.174*** 10.444***
Hansen J-stat. (overid. test) 1.517 9.485*** 0.025 9.031** 0.002 0.236 0.047 3.370 0.290 10.730 0.116 0.667 1.520 10.078*** 0.031 4.922* 0.004 0.225
Endog.test, Chi-sq: DI 39.559*** 29.749*** 45.954*** 8.445*** 39.643*** 42.452*** 16.173*** 8.482*** 19.326*** 0.402 16.318*** 16.209*** 38.018*** 24.640*** 44.300*** 5.662** 37.074*** 40.621***
Z score Z score 2Z score 1
Table 7 reports the regression using the instrument variables (IV-models). T-statistics are in parentheses and corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Explanatory variables are disclosure index (DI) on loan (DILoan), DI on other earning assests 
(DIEA), DI on deposits (DIDep), DI on other funding (DIFund), DI on memo lines (DIMemo), DI on income statements items, the control variables (PBV, Size, tier 1 capital ratio, coverage of insurance deposits, GDP growth, interest rate, inflation), and the time 
controls. Z-score =  (ROA+Equity-to-Assets)/SDROA, Z-score 1=ROA divided by SDROA, Z-score 2= EA divided by SDROA. The values of Z-score, Z-score 1 and Z-score 2 are in natural logarithm. Independent variables are in decimals except described otherwise. 




Table 7. Decomposing disclosure: Impact of disclosure components on risk (cont’d) 
Dep. Var
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
DILoan -0.00238                -0.0725***                -0.0485***                
(-0.43)                (-5.08)                (-3.43)                
DIEA -0.00109                -0.0272***                -0.0184***                
(-0.41)                (-4.78)                (-3.27)                
DIDep -0.00461                -0.0939***                -0.0615***                
(-0.65)                (-3.68)                (-2.99)                
DIFund -0.00846                -0.0318                -0.0817                
(-0.63)                (-1.15)                (-1.12)                
DIMemo -0.00293                -0.0548***                -0.0372***                
(-0.67)                (-5.11)                (-3.66)                
DIIS -0.00947   -0.106*** -0.0773***
(-0.71)   (-2.89)   (-2.80)   
PBV 0.0250 0.0251 0.0223 0.0353 0.0267 0.0341   -0.0464 -0.0377 -0.0930 -0.0163 -0.000745 0.0795   -0.0580 -0.0593 -0.0936 0.123 -0.0315 0.0342   
(0.79) (0.78) (0.71) (0.91) (0.82) (0.96)   (-0.75) (-0.72) (-1.11) (-0.25) (-0.01) (0.92)   (-1.05) (-1.22) (-1.35) (0.72) (-0.62) (0.50)   
Size 0.0230 0.0190 0.0305 0.0289 0.0255 0.0337   0.0688 0.00131 0.191 0.0324 0.0742 0.103   0.0279 -0.0230 0.0988 0.00596 0.0258 0.0512   
(0.60) (0.50) (0.71) (0.71) (0.64) (0.83)   (0.96) (0.02) (1.49) (0.38) (1.03) (0.84)   (0.47) (-0.45) (0.89) (0.05) (0.43) (0.58)   
Tier1 -0.0133 -0.0126 -0.0151 -0.0199 -0.0117 -0.0108   0.00319 0.0208 -0.0347 -0.0176 0.0335 0.0268   -0.0106 0.00286 -0.0351 -0.0751 0.00942 0.00686   
(-1.45) (-1.39) (-1.54) (-1.40) (-1.27) (-1.16)   (0.13) (0.99) (-0.96) (-0.61) (1.53) (1.01)   (-0.51) (0.16) (-1.24) (-1.20) (0.49) (0.29)   
Growth 0.0250** 0.0261*** 0.0260*** 0.0327** 0.0250** 0.0263*** 0.0541* 0.0942*** 0.0942*** 0.127*** 0.0706*** 0.0892*** 0.0759** 0.102*** 0.0996*** 0.156** 0.0879*** 0.0991***
(2.37) (2.72) (2.69) (2.48) (2.48) (2.70)   (1.78) (3.49) (2.74) (3.88) (2.63) (2.82)   (2.45) (3.60) (3.07) (2.43) (3.10) (3.16)   
Interest 0.00725 0.00852 0.00475 0.00432 0.00891 0.00904   -0.0605* -0.0289 -0.117*** -0.0734*** -0.0342 -0.0516   -0.0257 -0.00172 -0.0615** -0.0475 -0.00615 -0.0175   
(0.68) (0.78) (0.42) (0.34) (0.79) (0.77)   (-1.87) (-1.19) (-3.11) (-2.60) (-1.19) (-1.18)   (-1.01) (-0.08) (-1.99) (-1.12) (-0.24) (-0.51)   
Inflation 0.00303 0.00400 0.00113 0.00521 0.00590 0.00859   -0.0102 0.00291 -0.0573* -0.0202 0.0374 0.0567   0.0133 0.0290 -0.0130 0.0701 0.0518* 0.0699*  
(0.30) (0.38) (0.11) (0.44) (0.51) (0.65)   (-0.39) (0.13) (-1.84) (-0.80) (1.26) (1.15)   (0.57) (1.35) (-0.49) (0.95) (1.91) (1.76)   
Covdep 0.0416* 0.0386 0.0408 0.0501* 0.0334 0.0434*  0.226*** 0.156** 0.207** 0.244*** 0.0650 0.227*** 0.221*** 0.175** 0.207*** 0.284*** 0.112 0.223***
(1.68) (1.44) (1.60) (1.65) (1.10) (1.66)   (3.66) (2.56) (2.54) (3.60) (0.93) (2.63)   (3.39) (2.52) (2.80) (2.65) (1.49) (2.69)   
N 1023 1025 1023 1023 1023 1023   963 1027 1027 1025 1027 1027   1008 1008 1008 953 1008 1008   
F-stat 19.00*** 20.33*** 18.52*** 14.27*** 17.61*** 16.76*** 7.53*** 7.75*** 7.58*** 4.30*** 9.46*** 6.79*** 7.97*** 7.98*** 7.17*** 2.12*** 8.29*** 6.51***
Underid. test, Chi-sq(2):35.453*** 71.091*** 17.232*** 1.172  29.831*** 9.236** 33.068*** 62.103*** 15.326*** 1.429 30.174*** 11.899*** 30.982*** 68.428*** 15.443*** 2.452 28.433*** 11.584***
Hansen J stat. (overid.test)3.417 3.257 2.984 1.787 2.331 1.659 1.823 8.979*** 0.055 33.529*** 0.016 0.593 0.061 3.135 0.064 3.659 0.059 0.005
Endog.test , Chi-sq: DI0.167 0.815 0.602 0.468 1.976 1.201 30.030*** 24.498*** 39.023*** 2.578 33.147*** 34.533*** 14.488*** 8.341*** 16.122*** 4.830** 12.729*** 14.330***
NPL to Cap SDROA SDROE
 Table 7 reports the regression using the instrument variables (IV-models). T-statistics are in parentheses and corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Explanatory variables are disclosure index (DI) on loan (DILoan), DI on other 
earning assests (DIEA), DI on deposits (DIDep), DI on other funding (DIFund), DI on memo lines (DIMemo), DI on income statements items, the control variables (PBV, Size, tier-1 capital ratio, coverage of insurance deposits, GDP growth, interest rate, 
inflation), and the time controls. Z-score =  (ROA+Equity-to-Assets)/SDROA, Z-score 1=ROA divided by SDROA, Z-score 2= EA divided by SDROA. NPL-to-Cap = ratio of non-performing loan to gross loan divided by ratio of capital asset to total 
assets, SDROA = the standard deviation of ROA based on two previous years data, SDROE = standard deviation of return on equity. The values of Z-score, Z-score 1 and Z-score 2 are in natural logarithm. Independent variables are in decimals except 
described otherwise. Superscripts ***, **, and * denotes statistical significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively. 
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Table A.1 Robustness test: The impact of disclosure (DI) on bank risk using the fixed effect models  
Dep. Var
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4)   
DI 0.0214*** 0.0218*** 0.0220*** 0.0211*** 0.0133** 0.0135*** 0.0138*** 0.0130** 0.0218*** 0.0221*** 0.0224*** 0.0215*** 0.00106 0.00115 0.00105 0.0130** -0.0174***-0.0177***-0.0181***-0.0172*** -0.00786* -0.00793* -0.00837* -0.00814*  
(4.47) (4.59) (4.54) (4.36)   (2.51) (2.62) (2.63) (2.48)   (4.73) (4.84) (4.80) (4.63)   (0.34) (0.37) (0.34) (2.48)   (-4.09) (-4.21) (-4.24) (-4.02)   (-1.74) (-1.73) (-1.82) (-1.77)   
Insiders 0.00576 0.00553 0.00551 0.00499   0.0260*** 0.0262*** 0.0258*** 0.0259*** 0.00583 0.00566 0.00555 0.00519   0.00491 0.00481 0.00477 0.0259*** -0.00853 -0.00841 -0.00820 -0.00799   -0.00608 -0.00596 -0.00585 -0.00552   
(0.71) (0.68) (0.68) (0.64)   (3.38) (3.37) (3.36) (3.43)   (0.74) (0.71) (0.71) (0.69)   (0.84) (0.82) (0.81) (3.43)   (-1.10) (-1.08) (-1.06) (-1.08)   (-1.48) (-1.42) (-1.43) (-1.36)   
Inst 0.000372                -0.00197                -0.000104                0.000116                0.000634                0.00116                
(0.14)                (-0.79)                (-0.04)                (0.10)                (0.27)                (0.37)                
Gown -0.0180***                -0.0168***                -0.0173**                -0.00887***                0.0173***                0.00910                
(-2.73)                (-2.73)                (-2.59)                (-3.27)                (2.72)                (1.04)                
Block -0.00227                -0.00519*                -0.00310                -0.000808                0.00427                0.00331                
(-0.82)                (-1.79)                (-1.14)                (-0.74)                (1.61)                (0.97)                
HHI 0.000695   -0.00204   -0.0000456   -0.00204   0.00127   -0.00217   
(0.15)   (-0.41)   (-0.01)   (-0.41)   (0.29)   (-0.47)   
PBV 0.0371 0.0223 0.0350 0.0375   0.142* 0.126* 0.134* 0.136*  0.0416 0.0268 0.0384 0.0408   0.0203 0.00849 0.0200 0.136*  -0.0583 -0.0419 -0.0536 -0.0559   -0.0494 -0.0468 -0.0449 -0.0527   
(0.58) (0.36) (0.55) (0.58)   (1.94) (1.79) (1.83) (1.83)   (0.68) (0.45) (0.62) (0.65)   (0.51) (0.22) (0.51) (1.83)   (-1.02) (-0.77) (-0.94) (-0.97)   (-0.91) (-0.87) (-0.84) (-0.99)   
Size -0.00850 -0.00541 -0.00870 -0.00626   0.0397 0.0397 0.0383 0.0403   -0.00725 -0.00463 -0.00794 -0.00550   0.0324 0.0337 0.0324 0.0403   -0.00625 -0.00847 -0.00499 -0.00793   -0.0448 -0.0455 -0.0432 -0.0496   
(-0.15) (-0.10) (-0.15) (-0.11)   (0.51) (0.51) (0.50) (0.52)   (-0.13) (-0.08) (-0.14) (-0.10)   (0.80) (0.83) (0.80) (0.52)   (-0.11) (-0.14) (-0.08) (-0.13)   (-1.05) (-1.06) (-1.01) (-1.15)   
Tier1 0.0381 0.0380 0.0387 0.0377   -0.000152 0.000142 -0.000196 0.00158   0.0334 0.0334 0.0340 0.0333   -0.00741 -0.00796 -0.00763 0.00158   0.00787 0.00780 0.00709 0.00759   -0.0149 -0.0151 -0.0157 -0.0129   
(1.27) (1.29) (1.29) (1.26)   (-0.00) (0.00) (-0.01) (0.05)   (1.14) (1.16) (1.17) (1.14)   (-0.74) (-0.78) (-0.76) (0.05)   (0.30) (0.30) (0.27) (0.29)   (-0.66) (-0.68) (-0.70) (-0.57)   
Growth -0.112*** -0.111*** -0.113*** -0.111*** -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.108*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.108*** -0.105*** 0.0310*** 0.0330*** 0.0314*** -0.108*** 0.0979*** 0.0967*** 0.0989*** 0.0957*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.100***
(-3.65) (-3.61) (-3.70) (-3.57)   (-3.29) (-3.27) (-3.30) (-3.18)   (-3.59) (-3.54) (-3.63) (-3.49)   (3.06) (3.31) (3.15) (-3.18)   (3.38) (3.33) (3.42) (3.27)   (2.91) (2.88) (2.94) (2.88)   
Interest 0.0540** 0.0598*** 0.0543** 0.0519** 0.0739*** 0.0796*** 0.0745*** 0.0739*** 0.0521** 0.0578*** 0.0525** 0.0502** 0.0140 0.0167 0.0139 0.0739*** -0.0537***-0.0593***-0.0542*** -0.0519** -0.0281 -0.0309 -0.0285 -0.0289   
(2.44) (2.77) (2.46) (2.33)   (2.92) (3.31) (2.98) (2.91)   (2.45) (2.79) (2.48) (2.34)   (1.36) (1.65) (1.36) (2.91)   (-2.66) (-3.04) (-2.72) (-2.56)   (-1.36) (-1.53) (-1.38) (-1.39)   
Inflation 0.0123 0.0140 0.0113 0.0109   0.0237 0.0259 0.0214 0.0220   0.0104 0.0121 0.00906 0.00863   0.00324 0.00303 0.00274 0.0220   -0.0179 -0.0195 -0.0160 -0.0153   0.0118 0.00941 0.0130 0.00799   
(0.58) (0.67) (0.53) (0.49)   (0.92) (1.03) (0.84) (0.82)   (0.50) (0.59) (0.44) (0.40)   (0.28) (0.26) (0.23) (0.82)   (-0.84) (-0.94) (-0.76) (-0.69)   (0.53) (0.42) (0.58) (0.37)   
Covdep -0.226*** -0.208*** -0.224*** -0.227*** -0.241*** -0.222*** -0.235*** -0.241*** -0.216*** -0.199*** -0.214*** -0.217*** 0.0330 0.0428 0.0343 -0.241*** 0.195*** 0.178*** 0.192*** 0.194*** 0.217*** 0.207*** 0.214*** 0.217***
(-3.66) (-3.53) (-3.64) (-3.65)   (-3.37) (-3.31) (-3.34) (-3.37)   (-3.58) (-3.44) (-3.55) (-3.57)   (1.15) (1.51) (1.19) (-3.37)   (3.29) (3.18) (3.26) (3.27)   (3.22) (3.07) (3.22) (3.20)   
Intercept 2.759*** 2.841*** 2.817*** 2.743*** 0.619 0.652 0.707 0.554   2.648*** 2.716*** 2.714*** 2.627*** 3.579*** 3.631*** 3.611*** 0.554   -1.234 -1.289* -1.316* -1.205   1.807*** 1.812*** 1.761*** 1.889***
(3.64) (3.85) (3.74) (3.70)   (0.69) (0.73) (0.79) (0.62)   (3.54) (3.73) (3.67) (3.60)   (6.93) (6.98) (6.93) (0.62)   (-1.60) (-1.71) (-1.73) (-1.59)   (2.67) (2.77) (2.62) (2.84)   
No. obs, 968 973 972 965   891 895 894 889   968 973 972 965   965 970 969 889   968 973 972 965   955 960 959 953   
R-square 0.143 0.153 0.147 0.138   0.141 0.148 0.146 0.138   0.146 0.156 0.151 0.142   0.197 0.203 0.194 0.138   0.125 0.135 0.130 0.121   0.125 0.128 0.128 0.116   
F-stat. 6.319*** 6.660*** 6.463*** 6.001*** 6.264*** 6.827*** 6.638*** 6.094*** 6.674*** 7.032*** 6.838*** 6.315*** 10.11*** 11.64*** 10.08*** 6.094*** 5.994*** 6.336*** 6.191*** 5.609*** 5.739*** 5.959*** 5.948*** 5.348***
NPL to Cap SDROA SDROEZ-score Z-score 2Z-score 1
Table A.1 reports within estimations. T-statistics are in parentheses and corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Explanatory variables are disclosure index (DI), insider ownerships (Insider), institutional ownerships (Inst), block ownerships (Block), 
Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and control variables (PBV, Size, tier 1 capital ratio, coverage of insurance deposits, GDP growth, interest rate, inflation).  See Appendix B for details. Z-score =  (ROA+Equity-to-Assets)/SDROA, Z-score 1=ROA divided by SDROA, 
Z-score 2= EA divided by SDROA, NPL-to-Cap = ratio of non-performing loan to gross loan divided by ratio of capital asset to total assets (Size), SDROA = the standard deviation of ROA based on two previous years data, SDROE = standard deviation of return on 
equity. The values of dependent variables, Z-score, Z-score 1, Z-score 2, NPL to Cap, SDROA and SDROE are in natural logarithm. Independent variables are in decimals except described otherwise. Superscripts ***, **, and * denotes statistical significant at the .01, .05 




Table A.2 Robustness test: The impact of disclosure (DI) and the interaction terms on bank risk using the fixed effect 
models 
Dep. Var
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DI 0.0202*** 0.0193*** 0.0228*** 0.0217** 0.0184** 0.0120** 0.0150** 0.0121* 0.0129 0.0133 0.0204*** 0.0202*** 0.0229*** 0.0215*** 0.0190***
(4.14) (2.94) (4.25) (2.53) (2.52) (2.31) (2.38) (1.89) (1.22) (1.37) (4.34) (3.24) (4.44) (2.63) (2.82)
Insiders 0.0285 -0.00804 0.0235
(0.59) (-0.14) (0.52)
DIxInsiders -0.000233 0.000462 -0.000168
(-0.41) (0.66) (-0.32)
Inst -0.00339 0.00138 -0.00296
(-0.38) (0.18) (-0.36)
DIXInst 0.0000528 -0.0000489 0.0000400
(0.47) (-0.48) (0.37)
Gown -0.0142 -0.0213* -0.0142
(-1.16) (-1.71) (-1.18)
DIxGown -0.0000537 0.0000636 -0.0000437
(-0.37) (0.41) (-0.31)
Block -0.00263 -0.00627 -0.00432
(-0.28) (-0.67) (-0.49)
DIxBlock 0.00000489 0.0000139 0.0000174
(0.04) (0.10) (0.14)
HHI -0.00608 -0.00100 -0.00625
(-0.48) (-0.07) (-0.52)
DIxHHI 0.000102 -0.0000147 0.000094
(0.56) (-0.07) (0.55)
PBV 0.0415 0.0385 0.0225 0.0347 0.0363 0.150** 0.139* 0.123* 0.133* 0.135* 0.0437 0.0426 0.0269 0.0384 0.0396
(0.66) (0.60) (0.36) (0.54) (0.56) (2.11) (1.88) (1.74) (1.79) (1.80) (0.72) (0.69) (0.45) (0.62) (0.63)
TA -0.0158 -0.00827 -0.00352 -0.00896 -0.00975 0.0336 0.0392 0.0372 0.0370 0.0400 -0.0148 -0.00706 -0.00308 -0.00896 -0.00870
(-0.28) (-0.15) (-0.06) (-0.16) (-0.17) (0.44) (0.51) (0.48) (0.47) (0.51) (-0.27) (-0.13) (-0.06) (-0.16) (-0.16)
Tier1 0.0431 0.0378 0.0372 0.0384 0.0375 0.00180 -0.000882 -0.0000949 -0.000953 0.000816 0.0381 0.0331 0.0327 0.0338 0.0331
(1.43) (1.26) (1.26) (1.28) (1.25) (0.06) (-0.03) (-0.00) (-0.03) (0.03) (1.30) (1.13) (1.13) (1.16) (1.13)
Growth -0.113*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.114*** -0.111*** -0.113*** -0.113*** -0.112*** -0.113*** -0.110*** -0.108*** -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.108*** -0.106***
(-3.77) (-3.69) (-3.65) (-3.73) (-3.62) (-3.43) (-3.35) (-3.31) (-3.35) (-3.24) (-3.69) (-3.62) (-3.58) (-3.66) (-3.54)
Interest 0.0569*** 0.0540** 0.0598*** 0.0543** 0.0516** 0.0754*** 0.0728*** 0.0787*** 0.0737*** 0.0730*** 0.0556*** 0.0522** 0.0578*** 0.0525** 0.0499**
(2.76) (2.45) (2.78) (2.45) (2.33) (3.19) (2.87) (3.25) (2.94) (2.86) (2.81) (2.45) (2.79) (2.47) (2.34)
Inflation 0.0172 0.0135 0.0149 0.0116 0.0102 0.0279 0.0235 0.0259 0.0222 0.0229 0.0159 0.0114 0.0129 0.00949 0.00802
(0.84) (0.62) (0.70) (0.54) (0.46) (1.13) (0.92) (1.03) (0.88) (0.86) (0.79) (0.54) (0.62) (0.46) (0.37)
Covdep -0.238*** -0.225*** -0.207*** -0.224*** -0.225*** -0.251*** -0.242*** -0.224*** -0.235*** -0.242*** -0.228*** -0.216*** -0.199*** -0.214*** -0.215***
(-3.91) (-3.64) (-3.53) (-3.64) (-3.62) (-3.56) (-3.39) (-3.32) (-3.34) (-3.36) (-3.82) (-3.56) (-3.44) (-3.54) (-3.53)
Intercept 2.812*** 2.911*** 2.765*** 2.849*** 2.976*** 0.621 0.555 0.820 0.826 0.579 2.697*** 2.766*** 2.656*** 2.796*** 2.843***
(3.71) (3.45) (3.65) (3.09) (3.65) (0.70) (0.59) (0.88) (0.76) (0.55) (3.61) (3.34) (3.55) (3.10) (3.55)
No. obs, 1028 969 974 973 966 942 892 896 895 890 1028 969 974 973 966
R-square 0.150 0.143 0.153 0.147 0.138 0.148 0.138 0.145 0.143 0.136 0.153 0.146 0.156 0.151 0.142
F-stat. 8.192*** 6.346*** 6.758*** 6.422*** 5.944*** 7.321*** 5.453*** 6.045*** 6.241*** 5.351*** 8.620*** 6.700*** 7.117*** 6.819*** 6.253***
Significance test:
DI+DIxIown 17.43*** 6.05** 19.39***
DI+DIxInst 8.93*** 5.73**  10.78***
DI+DIxGown 18.42*** 3.71* 20.12***
DI+DIxBlock 6.57** 1.53 7.08***
DI+DIxHHI 6.66*** 1.95 8.35***
Z score Z-score 2Z-score 1
 
Table A.2 reports within estimations. T-statistics are in parentheses and corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Explanatory variables are disclosure 
index (DI), insider ownerships (Insiders), institutional ownerships (Inst), block ownerships (Block), Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and control variables. We also 
include interaction terms between disclosure and insider ownerships (DIxIown), institution ownerships (DIxinst), governerment ownerships (DIxgown), block ownerships 
(DIxblock), ownership concentration (DIxHHi) and the control variables (PBV, Size, Tier 1 capital ratio, coverage of insurance deposits, GDP growth, interest rate, inflation).  
Z-score = (ROA+Equity-to-Assets)/SDROA, Z-score 1=ROA divided by SDROA, Z-score 2= EA divided by SDROA. The values of dependent variables, Z-score, Z-score 1, 
Z-score 2 are in natural logarithm. Independent variables are in decimals except described otherwise. Significance test is the test of the null hypothesis that the sum of the 




Table A.2 Robustness test: The impact of disclosure (DI) and the interaction terms on bank risk using the fixed effect 
models (cont’d) 
Dep. Var
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DI 0.0000387 -0.000846 0.000722 -0.00505 -0.00280 -0.0158*** -0.0186*** -0.0168*** -0.0151** -0.0149** -0.00648 -0.00746 -0.00561 -0.00194 -0.00157
(0.01) (-0.26) (0.18) (-1.18) (-0.65) (-3.57) (-2.83) (-3.66) (-2.29) (-2.35) (-1.32) (-1.18) (-0.90) (-0.22) (-0.21)
Insiders -0.0393** -0.0107 0.0583
(-2.49) (-0.22) (1.05)
DIxInsiders 0.000527** -0.0000102 -0.000853
(2.22) (-0.02) (-1.27)
Inst -0.00327 -0.00150 0.00185
(-0.66) (-0.18) (0.20)
DIXInst 0.0000475 0.0000306 -0.00000948
(0.72) (0.28) (-0.08)
Gown -0.0106 0.0207* 0.0179
(-1.33) (1.69) (1.46)
DIxGown 0.0000244 -0.0000476 -0.000125
(0.25) (-0.33) (-0.81)
Block -0.00895** 0.00847 0.0123
(-2.00) (1.18) (1.19)
DIxBlock 0.000115* -0.0000605 -0.000130
(1.82) (-0.59) (-0.91)
HHI -0.0123 0.00674 0.0145
(-1.50) (0.57) (0.96)
DIxHHI 0.000157 -0.0000832 -0.000251
(1.38) (-0.49) (-1.18)
PBV 0.0250 0.0215 0.00787 0.0217 0.0173 -0.0575 -0.0567 -0.0407 -0.0542 -0.0546 -0.0766 -0.0493 -0.0449 -0.0475 -0.0498
(0.65) (0.54) (0.21) (0.56) (0.43) (-1.02) (-0.99) (-0.74) (-0.94) (-0.94) (-1.31) (-0.91) (-0.84) (-0.89) (-0.93)
TA 0.0199 0.0321 0.0331 0.0278 0.0273 0.00230 -0.00622 -0.00689 -0.00138 -0.00514 -0.0193 -0.0449 -0.0411 -0.0352 -0.0409
(0.48) (0.79) (0.80) (0.66) (0.64) (0.04) (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.02) (-0.09) (-0.43) (-1.05) (-0.94) (-0.80) (-0.94)
Tier1 -0.0137 -0.00774 -0.00799 -0.00772 -0.00692 0.00657 0.00827 0.00779 0.00743 0.00791 -0.00710 -0.0145 -0.0160 -0.0156 -0.0129
(-1.37) (-0.77) (-0.79) (-0.77) (-0.71) (0.25) (0.31) (0.30) (0.28) (0.30) (-0.33) (-0.65) (-0.71) (-0.69) (-0.57)
Growth 0.0272*** 0.0306*** 0.0325*** 0.0305*** 0.0306*** 0.0991*** 0.0988*** 0.0974*** 0.0997*** 0.0968*** 0.108*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.102***
(2.97) (2.98) (3.21) (3.05) (2.95) (3.47) (3.42) (3.36) (3.45) (3.33) (3.16) (2.94) (2.91) (2.96) (2.94)
Interest 0.00708 0.0141 0.0165 0.0135 0.0145 -0.0557*** -0.0535*** -0.0592*** -0.0540*** -0.0516** -0.0203 -0.0281 -0.0307 -0.0281 -0.0283
(0.71) (1.38) (1.64) (1.34) (1.42) (-2.97) (-2.65) (-3.01) (-2.69) (-2.55) (-1.01) (-1.36) (-1.50) (-1.35) (-1.37)
Inflation 0.00202 0.00420 0.00299 0.00429 0.00141 -0.0233 -0.0178 -0.0193 -0.0170 -0.0149 0.00885 0.0114 0.0107 0.0115 0.0101
(0.17) (0.36) (0.26) (0.37) (0.12) (-1.14) (-0.84) (-0.92) (-0.81) (-0.68) (0.41) (0.51) (0.48) (0.52) (0.46)
Covdep 0.0414 0.0341 0.0422 0.0370 0.0370 0.203*** 0.196*** 0.179*** 0.190*** 0.193*** 0.210*** 0.217*** 0.209*** 0.210*** 0.213***
(1.47) (1.18) (1.49) (1.29) (1.27) (3.48) (3.30) (3.19) (3.22) (3.24) (3.14) (3.23) (3.08) (3.17) (3.17)
Intercept 3.952*** 3.717*** 3.676*** 4.086*** 3.936*** -1.362* -1.173 -1.385* -1.573* -1.402* 1.356* 1.768** 1.592** 1.235 1.328*
(7.15) (7.37) (6.40) (7.06) (6.40) (-1.75) (-1.37) (-1.79) (-1.80) (-1.70) (1.88) (2.37) (2.12) (1.35) (1.66)
No. obs, 1025 966 971 970 963 1028 969 974 973 966 1009 956 961 960 954
R-square 0.238 0.197 0.203 0.197 0.202 0.128 0.125 0.135 0.130 0.121 0.118 0.125 0.129 0.129 0.118
F-stat. 13.38*** 10.01*** 12.23*** 10.00*** 10.58*** 7.160*** 5.880*** 6.203*** 6.111*** 5.487*** 8.092*** 5.427*** 5.975*** 5.703*** 4.952***
Significance test:
DI+DIxIown 0.03 13.16*** 2.34
DI+DIxInst 0.06 8.19*** 1.44
DI+DIxGown 0.04 13.85*** 0.88
DI+DIxBlock 1.35 5.42** 0.06
DI+DIxHHI 0.39 5.80** 0.06
NPL to Cap SDROA SDROE
Table A.2 reports within estimations. T-statistics are in parentheses and corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Explanatory variables are disclosure 
index (DI), insider ownerships (Insiders), institutional ownerships (Inst), block ownerships (Block), Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and control variables. We also include 
interaction terms between disclosure and insider ownerships (DIxInsiders), institution ownerships (DIxinst), government ownerships (DIxgown), block ownerships (DIxblock), 
ownership concentration (DIxHHi) and the control variables (PBV, Size, Tier 1 capital ratio, coverage of insurance deposits, GDP growth, interest rate, inflation). NPL-to-Cap = 
ratio of non-performing loan to gross loan divided by ratio of capital asset to total assets (TA), SDROA = the standard deviation of ROA based on two previous years data, SDROE 
= standard deviation of return on equity. The values of dependent variables NPL to Cap, SDROA and SDROE are in natural logarithm. Independent variables are in decimals 
except described otherwise. Significance test is the test of the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of disclosure and the interaction term do not have joint impacts on 
risk. Superscripts ***, **, and * denotes statistical significant at the .01, .05 and .10 levels respectively. 
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Table A.3 Robustness tests: The impact of disclosure components on bank risk  
Dep. var.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DILoan 0.0119**                0.00658*                0.0120**                
(2.51)                (1.66)                (2.55)                
DIEA 0.00759***                0.00664***                0.00723***                
(3.49)                (3.20)                (3.40)                
DIDep 0.00623                -0.000406                0.00672                
(1.32)                (-0.12)                (1.48)                
DIFund -0.00552*                -0.00665**                -0.00493                
(-1.77)                (-2.11)                (-1.64)                
DIMemo 0.0115***                0.00585                0.0118***                
(3.28)                (1.57)                (3.42)                
DIIS 0.0103** 0.00618   0.0100** 
(2.32)   (1.57)   (2.21)   
PBV 0.0517 0.0488 0.0592 0.0667 0.0432 0.0432   0.157** 0.145** 0.160** 0.175** 0.153** 0.153** 0.0540 0.0515 0.0617 0.0680 0.0452 0.0460   
(0.79) (0.76) (0.90) (1.01) (0.68) (0.68)   (2.21) (2.00) (2.27) (2.43) (2.15) (2.16)   (0.86) (0.84) (0.97) (1.07) (0.73) (0.75)   
Size -0.0356 -0.0221 -0.0363 -0.0220 -0.0379 -0.0333   0.0316 0.0345 0.0392 0.0382 0.0300 0.0332   -0.0347 -0.0212 -0.0363 -0.0213 -0.0373 -0.0321   
(-0.51) (-0.32) (-0.53) (-0.31) (-0.57) (-0.48)   (0.37) (0.42) (0.45) (0.45) (0.36) (0.39)   (-0.51) (-0.31) (-0.55) (-0.31) (-0.57) (-0.47)   
Tier1 0.0423 0.0376 0.0441 0.0368 0.0358 0.0394   0.00314 0.000822 0.00121 -0.00423 0.000125 0.00109   0.0373 0.0328 0.0393 0.0323 0.0307 0.0345   
(1.42) (1.23) (1.48) (1.22) (1.19) (1.35)   (0.10) (0.03) (0.04) (-0.13) (0.00) (0.04)   (1.29) (1.10) (1.36) (1.09) (1.05) (1.21)   
Growth -0.116*** -0.120*** -0.123*** -0.121*** -0.116*** -0.122*** -0.116*** -0.118*** -0.121*** -0.118*** -0.116*** -0.119*** -0.110*** -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.115*** -0.110*** -0.117***
(-3.77) (-4.00) (-3.87) (-3.85) (-3.78) (-3.87)   (-3.46) (-3.62) (-3.56) (-3.54) (-3.47) (-3.52)   (-3.70) (-3.92) (-3.81) (-3.80) (-3.70) (-3.82)   
Interest 0.0604*** 0.0515** 0.0635*** 0.0570*** 0.0546** 0.0590*** 0.0778*** 0.0687*** 0.0770*** 0.0745*** 0.0746*** 0.0777*** 0.0592*** 0.0507** 0.0626*** 0.0560*** 0.0532*** 0.0578***
(2.83) (2.50) (2.95) (2.75) (2.60) (2.78)   (3.23) (2.91) (3.25) (3.11) (3.15) (3.29)   (2.86) (2.55) (3.02) (2.80) (2.64) (2.82)   
Inflation 0.0279 0.0205 0.0324 0.0333 0.0158 0.0220   0.0349 0.0253 0.0366 0.0409* 0.0286 0.0319   0.0267 0.0198 0.0313 0.0319 0.0142 0.0211   
(1.36) (1.03) (1.62) (1.63) (0.75) (1.06)   (1.44) (1.10) (1.53) (1.69) (1.15) (1.28)   (1.33) (1.02) (1.60) (1.59) (0.69) (1.04)   
Covdep -0.255*** -0.237*** -0.252*** -0.248*** -0.221*** -0.254*** -0.265*** -0.245*** -0.262*** -0.256*** -0.246*** -0.264*** -0.245*** -0.227*** -0.242*** -0.238*** -0.210*** -0.244***
(-4.21) (-3.75) (-4.20) (-4.13) (-3.66) (-4.15)   (-3.82) (-3.42) (-3.75) (-3.71) (-3.49) (-3.76)   (-4.13) (-3.68) (-4.12) (-4.05) (-3.57) (-4.07)   
Intercept 3.817*** 3.948*** 3.995*** 4.665*** 3.420*** 3.425*** 1.135 1.171 1.394 1.916** 0.958 0.867   3.714*** 3.863*** 3.876*** 4.521*** 3.300*** 3.348***
(4.58) (4.85) (4.95) (5.60) (4.00) (3.66)   (1.21) (1.29) (1.49) (2.03) (1.01) (0.90)   (4.50) (4.81) (4.88) (5.48) (3.89) (3.57)   
N 1030 1030 1030 1030 1030 1030   944 944 944 944 944 944   1030 1030 1030 1030 1030 1030   
R-squared 0.139 0.146 0.130 0.135 0.146 0.138   0.140 0.149 0.137 0.146 0.140 0.140   0.140 0.146 0.131 0.134 0.149 0.138   
F-statistic 7.371*** 8.222*** 7.141*** 7.810*** 7.630*** 7.116*** 6.682*** 7.379*** 6.224*** 6.995*** 6.667*** 6.388*** 7.675*** 8.404*** 7.412*** 7.978*** 7.926*** 7.283***
Z-Score Z-Score 2Z-Score 1
Table A.3 reports within estimations of bank risk on the disclosure components. T-statistics are in parentheses and corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Explanatory variables are disclosure index (DI) on loan (DILoan), DI on other 
earning assests (DIEA), DI on deposits (DIDep), DI on other funding (DIFund), DI on memo lines (DIMemo), DI on income statements items, the control variables (PBV, Size, tier 1 capital ratio, coverage of insurance deposits, GDP growth, interest rate, inflation), 
and the time controls. See Appendix B for details. Z-score =  (ROA+Equity-to-Assets)/SDROA, Z-score 1=ROA divided by SDROA, Z-score 2= EA divided by SDROA. The values of Z-score, Z-score 1 and Z-score 2 are in natural logarithm. Independent 
variables are in decimals except described otherwise. Superscripts ***, **, and * denotes statistical significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively. 
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Table A.3 Robustness tests: The impact of disclosure components on bank risk (cont’d) 
Dep. var.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DILoan -0.000291                -0.00943**                -0.00439                
(-0.12)                (-2.07)                (-0.88)                
DIEA 0.000866                -0.00554***                -0.00491**                
(0.87)                (-2.66)                (-2.13)                
DIDep -0.0000464                -0.00481                -0.000870                
(-0.02)                (-1.15)                (-0.17)                
DIFund 0.000404                0.00440                0.00665***                
(0.29)                (1.58)                (2.65)                
DIMemo 0.00337                -0.0100***                -0.00597*                
(1.64)                (-3.26)                (-1.89)                
DIIS 0.00322   -0.00939*** -0.00492   
(1.09)   (-2.70)   (-1.56)   
PBV 0.0241 0.0231 0.0239 0.0234 0.0209 0.0205   -0.0647 -0.0629 -0.0706 -0.0766 -0.0569 -0.0563   -0.0781 -0.0745 -0.0803 -0.0936 -0.0723 -0.0728   
(0.63) (0.61) (0.63) (0.62) (0.55) (0.55)   (-1.11) (-1.10) (-1.21) (-1.30) (-0.99) (-0.99)   (-1.33) (-1.29) (-1.37) (-1.55) (-1.24) (-1.24)   
Size 0.0196 0.0195 0.0194 0.0189 0.0133 0.0147   0.0180 0.00742 0.0183 0.00727 0.0209 0.0173   -0.0130 -0.0186 -0.0154 -0.0193 -0.0102 -0.0127   
(0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.34) (0.37)   (0.26) (0.11) (0.27) (0.10) (0.31) (0.25)   (-0.30) (-0.44) (-0.35) (-0.43) (-0.23) (-0.29)   
Tier1 -0.0132 -0.0136 -0.0132 -0.0128 -0.0147 -0.0139   0.00701 0.0105 0.00567 0.0114 0.0125 0.00952   -0.00794 -0.00487 -0.00807 -0.00281 -0.00494 -0.00676   
(-1.33) (-1.38) (-1.29) (-1.26) (-1.47) (-1.43)   (0.27) (0.40) (0.22) (0.44) (0.48) (0.38)   (-0.37) (-0.22) (-0.37) (-0.13) (-0.23) (-0.31)   
Growth 0.0265*** 0.0271*** 0.0267*** 0.0264*** 0.0287*** 0.0268*** 0.101*** 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.101*** 0.106*** 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.112*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.112***
(2.91) (2.93) (2.87) (2.77) (2.99) (2.87)   (3.50) (3.68) (3.59) (3.57) (3.49) (3.59)   (3.19) (3.26) (3.24) (3.18) (3.18) (3.24)   
Interest 0.00730 0.00633 0.00727 0.00744 0.00540 0.00669   -0.0585*** -0.0520*** -0.0609*** -0.0558*** -0.0535*** -0.0573*** -0.0218 -0.0162 -0.0220 -0.0188 -0.0190 -0.0212   
(0.75) (0.64) (0.73) (0.76) (0.57) (0.73)   (-3.03) (-2.77) (-3.17) (-2.95) (-2.82) (-3.00)   (-1.08) (-0.83) (-1.08) (-0.94) (-0.94) (-1.05)   
Inflation 0.00258 0.00133 0.00250 0.00238 -0.00141 0.000442   -0.0318 -0.0266 -0.0353* -0.0361* -0.0211 -0.0261   0.00458 0.0104 0.00347 -0.000387 0.0114 0.00792   
(0.23) (0.11) (0.22) (0.21) (-0.13) (0.04)   (-1.58) (-1.36) (-1.82) (-1.80) (-1.01) (-1.28)   (0.22) (0.48) (0.17) (-0.02) (0.51) (0.37)   
Covdep 0.0410 0.0428 0.0410 0.0406 0.0499* 0.0402   0.217*** 0.203*** 0.214*** 0.211*** 0.187*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.205*** 0.215*** 0.209*** 0.199*** 0.216***
(1.47) (1.52) (1.46) (1.45) (1.79) (1.44)   (3.73) (3.39) (3.72) (3.66) (3.24) (3.69)   (3.26) (3.04) (3.23) (3.17) (2.99) (3.23)   
Intercept 3.966*** 3.922*** 3.957*** 3.926*** 3.733*** 3.718*** -2.147*** -2.268*** -2.292*** -2.820*** -1.767** -1.736** 1.069* 1.101* 0.948 0.413 1.341** 1.301** 
(8.33) (8.43) (8.15) (7.87) (7.69) (7.10)   (-2.63) (-2.84) (-2.93) (-3.45) (-2.17) (-2.04)   (1.74) (1.92) (1.51) (0.70) (2.23) (2.11)   
N 1027 1027 1027 1027 1027 1027   1030 1030 1030 1030 1030 1030   1011 1011 1011 1011 1011 1011   
R-squared 0.237 0.238 0.237 0.237 0.244 0.241   0.119 0.122 0.113 0.116 0.128 0.121   0.117 0.124 0.115 0.128 0.121 0.118   
F-statistic 15.184*** 14.962*** 17.570*** 12.832*** 12.324*** 11.919*** 6.755*** 7.190*** 6.507*** 6.923*** 7.256*** 6.551*** 6.098*** 6.044*** 6.177*** 7.108*** 6.085*** 6.144***
NPL-to-Cap SDROA SDROE
Table A.3 reports within estimations of bank risk on the disclosure components. T-statistics are in parentheses and corrected for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. Explanatory variables are DI on loan (DILoan), DI on other earning 
assests (DIEA), DI on deposits (DIDep), DI on other funding (DIFund), DI on memo lines (DIMemo), DI on income statements items, the control variables (PBV, Size, tier 1 capital ratio, coverage of insurance deposits, GDP growth, interest rate, 
inflation), and the time controls. See Appendix B for details. NPL-to-Cap = ratio of non-performing loan to gross loan divided by ratio of capital asset to total assets, SDROA = the standard deviation of ROA based on two previous years data, SDROE 
= standard deviation of return on equity. The values of NPL-to-Cap, SDROA, and SDROE are in natural logarithm. Independent variables are in decimals except described otherwise. Superscripts ***, **, and * denotes statistical significant at the 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively. 
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Appendix B Variable Definition 
Variable Description Source 
Panel A: Dependent  variables 
Z score Return on average assets (ROA) plus equity to total assets ratio, 
divided by the standard deviation of last three-year ROA 
Bankscope 
Z score 1 Return on average assets (ROA) divided by the standard 
deviation of last three-year ROA 
Bankscope 
Z score 2 Equity to total assets ratio, divided by the standard deviation of 
last three-year ROA 
Bankscope 
NPL to Cap Bank non performing loan to total loans divided by bank capital 
to total assets 
Bankscope 
SDROA Standard deviation of last three-year return on average assets Bankscope 
SDROE Standard deviation of last three-year return on average equity Bankscope 
Panel B: Independent variables 
Disclosure index (DI) The disclosure index based on 17 items as Bauman and Nier 




Total fraction of shares owned by directors or supervisors Bankscope 
Government ownerships 
(Gown) 
Total fraction of shares owned by government institution/bodies. Bankscope 
Institution ownerships 
(Inst) 
Total fraction of shares owned by institutions Bankscope 











, where si is the percentage of ownerships 
characteristic i in the bank 
Datastream 
Price to Book ratio (PBV) Market value of equity divided by book value of equity Bankscope 
Tier 1 capital ratio Tier-1 capital divided by risk weighted assets Bankscope 
Size (TA) The natural logarithm of book value of total assets Bankscope 
GDP growth (Growth) Annual real GDP growth rate  World 
Development 
Indicator (WDI) 
Real interest rate Real interest rate WDI 
Inflation rate Inflation rate  WDI 
Covdep The natural log value of (1+coverage deposits), where coverage 
deposits is the ratio of the maximum deposit insurance coverage 
limit per deposit per capita 
Authors’calculation 
based on the data 
from Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. (2005), 
updated for Asia  
Year dummy  Six individual dummy variables which equals  
either one or zero for each year from 2005 to 2010  











S1 Loans by maturity <3 months, 3-6 months, 6 months-1 year, 1-5 
years, >5 years
S2 Loans by type loans to municipalities/government, mortgages, 
lease, other loans
S3 Loans by counterparty loans to group companies, loans to other 
corporate, loans to banks
S4 Problem loans total problems loans
S5 Problem loans by type overdue, restructured, other non-performing
Other earning 
assets
S6 Securities by type detailed breakdown: T-bills, other bills, bonds, 
CDs, equity investments, other investments
coarse breakdown: government securities, other 
listed securities, non-listed securities
S7 Securities by holding 
purpose
investment securities, trading securities
Liabilities
Deposits S8 Deposits by maturity demand savings, <3 months, 3-6 months, 6 
months-1 year, 1-5 years, >5 years
S9 Deposits by type of 
customer
bank deposits, municipal/government
Other funding S10 Money market funding total money market funding
S11 Long-term funding
convertible bonds, martgage bonds, other 
bonds, subordinated debt, hybrid capital
Memo
S12 Reserve loan loss reserves (memo)
S13 Capital
Total capital ratio, tier 1 ratio, total capital, tier 1 
capital
S14 Continget liabilities total contingent liabilities
S15 Off Balance Sheet Off balance sheet items
Income Statement
S16 Non interest income
net commission income, net fee income, net 
trading income
S17 Loan loss provisions Loan loss provisions
Sub Index
 
Source: Nier (2005) 
